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LAW, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE
NEW ECONOMY©
By

HARRY

W. ARTHURS*

The diverse, dynamic, and inchoate developments we
call the new economy are a catalyst for responsive and
reflexive changes in the production of law, legal
institututions, and the legal profession in Canada and
elsewhere. This article examines these changes
alongside ongoing themes of the privatization of legal
production, hybridization, and juridification. The
resulting transformation of legal production has
reshaped the role of law experts and aggravated
existing tendencies of stratification, concentration,
diversification, and marginalization within the legal
profession itself.

AND ROBERT KRBKLEWICH**

Les d6veloppements divers, dynamiques et
rudimentaires que nous hppelons la nouvelle 6conomie
sont un catalyseur pour des changements en r6ponse et
des changements rfflexifs dans la production de loi, les
institutions 16gales, et la profession Ifgale an Canada et
alleurs. Cet article examine ces changements a c6t6
des thames continuants de la privatisation de la
production Ifgale, la hybridation et lajuridification. La
transformation de la production lfgale qui rfsulte a
reconstruit le role des experts en droit et aggrav6 les
tendances existantes de la stratification, la
concentration, la diversification, et ]a marginalisation h
l'intfrieur de la profession lgale elle-mme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The new economy seems to be a "brooding omnipresence" in
contemporary discussions of democracy, social relations and, of course,
the distribution of wealth, opportunity, and distress. It is no less
brooding, no less omnipresent, in discussions about law, one of the
primary means available to nation-states to address-benignly or
repressively-those very issues.
Any discussion of how the new economy affects and is affected
by law must begin with a definition of the object in view. Conventionally
defined-conventionally, that is, by lawyers-"law" may be said to
comprise a body of rules promulgated by duly authorized organs of the
state, and enforced by the exercise of its coercive powers. However,
other definitions are common, if not conventional, in the discourse of
social science. Law is often used to encompass not only the rules of the
state legal system, but also the institutions and processes by which the
state promulgates and enforces law.1 This is a significant expansion of
the first definition: it reminds us of the social, political, and cultural
1 See H.M. Hart, Jr. & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and

Application of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Unpublished tentative ed., 1958); and W.N. Eskridge, Jr. &
P.P. Frickey, "Commentary. The Making of the Legal Process" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031.
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context within which legal rules are made and applied and also,
therefore, of the source of law's contingency and variability.
Further, law is sometimes described as a "field," constituted by a
body of professional knowledge and professional praxis. The legal field
is shaped by an internal dynamic, generated both by professionals and
other important actors whose knowledge constitutes the field, as well as
by interaction with other fields. 2 This important extension of the notion
of law points to the need to seek its existence not only in the environs of
the state, its rules and institutions, but also in spheres populated by
professional actors located in non-state institutions such as law firms and
consultancies.
Finally, a growing body of scholarship speaks of legal pluralism,
of the significant normative dimension of all social relations, of law
deeply imbricated within social relations, rather than imposed by the
state or other external forces.3 This view of law acknowledges the
importance of the state and of professional actors, but does not privilege
state or professional contributions to law over those of other participants
in social institutions such as the family, the community, the marketplace,
and the workplace, which generate these ubiquitous normative regimes.
Our examination of law in the context of the new economy
necessarily draws upon more complex and dynamic definitions of the
subject, rather than upon the narrow and static view of law as merely an
autonomous and self-contained body of legal rules promulgated by the
state. In the same spirit, we use the term "legal institution" to include
not just formally constituted organs of state law, but rather all ongoing,
repeated, or organized social interactions, state and non-state, formal
and informal, explicit and implicit. 4 Thus defined, legal institutions

2 P. Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38
Hastings L. Rev. 805; Y. Dezalay, "Negotiated Justice Within the Field of Law: The French
Example" in K. Plett & C.S. Meschievitz, eds., Beyond Disputing: Exploring Legal Culture in Five
European Countries (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) 117; and Y. Dezalay & B.
Garth, "Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes" (1995) 29 Law & Soc'y Rev. 27.
3 See, for example, M. Galanter, "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law" (1981) 19 J. Legal Plur. 1; S.E. Merry, "Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 869; and J. Griffiths, "What is Legal Pluralism?" (1986) 24 J. Legal Plur. 1.
4 R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches" (1988) Int'l Stud. Q. 32; J.G.
Ruggie, "Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution" in J.G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism
Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993) 3; P. Cooke, "Institutional Reflexivity and the Rise of the Region State" in G.,Benko & U.
Strohmayer, eds., Space and Social Theory: GeographicInterpretationsof Postmoderniy (London:
Blackwell, forthcoming); and G. Teubner, "Evolution of Autopoietic Law' in G. Teubner, ed.,
Autopoietic Law:A NewApproach to Law and Society (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 217.
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include all sites of normativity, all contexts within which norms are
generated, promulgated, and enforced with a view to shaping conduct by
human agents.
While these definitions of "law" and "legal institutions" are
grounded in current theorizing, they also happen to be particularly
apposite for a discussion of the concatenation of political, economic, and
technological developments which we refer to as the "new economy," a
term which also deserves definition, and will receive it shortly, in Part II,
below. At the threshold of our analysis, however, we want to suggest
that it is no coincidence that the state and its travails have become a
problem for contemporary scholarship about law, just as it is in debates
over socio-economic and political developments. For a very long time,
in both traditions of discourse, we have focused upon, perhaps been
mesmerized by, the state-as a vehicle of aspiration and an agency of
repression, as contested terrain and an impartial, unifying symbol, as the
embodiment of power and the epitome of impotence, as the alterego of
community and as its nemesis. But when we attempt to resolve these
contradictions-to try to imagine law without the state and economy
without the state-we are beset with conceptual dilemmas and practical
difficulties. Nonetheless, we must persevere. If we persist in thinking of
state, law, and economy as having a specified and invariable relationship,
rather than one which is contestable and changing, we will limit our own
ability to perceive large events and comprehend small ones.
This paper is indeed an attempt to comprehend certain rather
small events. How is law made, we want to ask, when the state is under
siege as a concept and as a palpable presence? By whom? And
especially, with what consequences for the legal profession? At the same
time, our paper is about the relationship between those small events and
larger ones which are transforming economies, societies, and polities
everywhere.
We begin with a tour of the new economy-around the world in
half a dozen pages-and end in the upholstered precincts of law offices.
Need we say it? The paper is necessarily impressionistic.
II. THE "NEW ECONOMY"
The "new economy" is obviously not a term of precision, nor are
its boundaries strictly limited to the economic realm. Its novelty largely
resides in the fact that certain simultaneous, and arguably interrelated,
developments are occurring at the level of world order, of the state and
of production. The result, as we will suggest below, is an unusually
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powerful challenge to established institutions and understandings.
Speaking specifically to law and legal institutions, this challenge does
not, of course, imply that the old is immediately and universally replaced
with the new. On the contrary, although we will focus upon the new
economy, we will also try to keep in view the reactions-indeed, the
resistance-of law and legal institutions associated with the old economy
or, rather, the old economies which persist everywhere and predominate
in most parts of the world. The persistence of these older expressions of
law ensures that the new shape of law and legal institutions will only
gradually become clearer as the old and new become visible side-by-side,
or as old and new are subsumed into complex hybrids which contain part
of both.S
Keeping in mind all of these disclaimers, however, we do
propose to identify, in a summary way, the implications and complexities
of the phenomenon known in the vernacular as the "new economy." As
suggested, the new economy is both defined by and defines (a) a "new
world order," (b) "new patterns of state-civil society relations,"' 6 and (c)
a "new techno-economic paradigm." These replace or reshape their
respective predecessors (a) the old post-war PaxAmericana world order
and related Bretton Woods institutions, (b) the interventionist,
Keynesian welfare state, and (c) the traditional, Fordist paradigm of7
mass manufacturing and its familiar labour market institutions.
Following a brief explanation of each of these elements, we will consider
their implications for law, legal institutions, and the legal profession.

5 B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the
ParadigmaticTransition (New York: Routledge, 1995) c. 4.
6 R. Grinspun & R. Kreklewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 'Free Trade' as a
Conditioning Framework" (1994) 43 Stud. Pol. Econ. 33.
7 Fordism is generally characterized as standardized mass production using assembly-line
techniques, single-purpose machinery, and semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Large inventories of
parts are used as buffer stocks to ensure continuous high-volume production runs. Industrial
relations in traditional Fordist industries generally comprised (in the North American case)
Wagner-style social contracts between labour and management in which labour concedes to
management much shop-floor autonomy, overall production strategy, and the right to strike over
the course of a collective agreement in return for tolerance of unionization, perhaps even industrywide or pattern bargaining in core industries (e.g., automobile), and labour's guaranteed shares in
productivity gains. In the European context, the state has undertaken a more overt role as a
mediator between labour and management in more broadly based, tripartite, or corporatist
institutional arrangements. See generally R.W. Cox, Production,Power, and World Order: Social
Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); and R. Boyer, ed.,
The Search for LabourMarket Flexibility: The European Economies in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon,
1988).
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A. A New World Order
A new world order has been evolving since the early 1970s.
Contributing to its dynamic have been challenges to the post-war role of
the United States as world military, economic, and political leader,8 the
deterioration of the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr)
regime 9 and trade multilateralism,1 0 the end of the gold standard and
financial regulation/ 1 the restructuring of Bretton Woods institutions,
notably GATr-wTo, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank/ 2 and increasing recourse to new strategies of non-tariff
protectionism.' 3 To be sure, the new world order of the 1990s is not
entirely orderly; potential for instability resides in the sudden collapse of

8 The United States' share of world capital experienced a noticeable decline from 41.9 per cent
to 33.6 per cent over the period 1963-1980. Statistics cited from M.K. Hawes, "The Steel Industry:
Change and Challenge" (1986-87) 42 Int'l J. 25 at 32. See also Cox, supra note 7; and R.O.
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperationand Discordin the World PoliticalEconomy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
9 GATr's decline can be measured by the increasing percentage of world trade taking place
outside GATT jurisdiction, under some rubric of a "managed-trade" agreement, or subject to a
plethora of subtle non-tariff barrier protection. In manufactured commodities, which account for
roughly 40 percent of total world trade, the ratio of managed trade to total trade rose from 13 per
cent in 1974 to 30 per cent in 1982. See Hawes, supra note 8 at 35.
10
oATr is only viable to the extent the major, post-war economic powers, of which the United
States was the most predominant, were prepared to play by its rules or overlook the bending of
GArr rules by other countries in times of crises. The United States had this capacity during the
initial decades of post-war reconstruction. GATr's influence progressively deteriorated during the
economically turbulent decade of the 1970s, as the United States, in particular, shifted its emphasis
from GATr and multilateralism to a more aggressive bilateralism and unilateralism in trade. We see
this evidenced first by President Nixon's surcharge of 10 per cent placed on all American imports in
1971. This induced a similar shift in trade policies amongst most GATr member-countries. This is
not to suggest that GATr is no longer relevant; indeed, it may achieve even greater prominence with
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and its reformulation into an even more powerful World
Trade Organization (wro).
11 M. Bienefeld, "Financial Deregulation: Disarming the Nation-State" (1992) 37 Stud. Pol.
Econ. 31.
12 Canada added its voice in calling for reforms to the imu to prevent currency speculation
during the August, 1995 G-7 summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia, which Prime Minister Chretien hosted.
13 Studies estimate that by 1983 nearly one-half of all international trade was under
"quantitative controls and that proportion is burgeoning." See F. Clairmonte & J.H. Cavanagh,
"Transnational Corporations and the Struggle for the Global Market" (1983) 13 J. Contemp. Asia
446 at 472. G. Hufbauer, "Beyond GAiT" (1989-90) 77 Foreign Pol'y 64 at 68, contends that by
1987, non-tariff barriers probably diminished world commerce by about U.S. $330 billion and that
their restrictive effect is now likely three to four times greater than existing tariff barriers.
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the Soviet empire, 14 and the fitful experiments in reconstruction being
conducted in Russia and Eastern Europe. Unlike the bipolar post-war
world, the new order is multipolar,1 5 with three powerful regional
economic spaces, each dominated by a regional power. Most advanced,
in formal terms, are the European Community (Ec) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA), dominated by Germany and
the United States, respectively. While these two regional blocs have
each been considering expansion-the Ec into post-communist Central
and Eastern Europe, and NAFrA into South America, possibly beginning
with Chile 16 -domestic and international political considerations have,
for the moment, slowed momentum. Less advanced in terms of formal
integration, but arguably experiencing greater momentum, is the "Yen
bloc" of Southeast Asia, led by Japan.1 7 Whether regional economic
integration will lead to global liberalization or to regional neomercantilism---"Fortress Europe" and "Fortress North America' -is not
yet clear.
One important effect of these developments is to secure the
"deep integration" of the state within global and regional economic

14 The breakdown of the Soviet Union itself has spawned numerous ethnic/nationalist
conflicts. This same strife has consumed the former nation of Yugoslavia.
15 This is also partly due to the growing competitiveness of many newly industrializing
countries (Nics) in Latin America and Southeast Asia. As a consequence, Latin American and
South-East Asian Nics almost doubled their share of world capital over the period 1963-1980 from
6.2 per cent to 10.1 per cent, as has Japan (7.1 per cent to 15.5 per cent). See Hawes, supra note 8 at
32. The statistics include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, Hong Kong, and South Korea within the
group of Latin American and East Asian NmCs.
16 Canada's Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, announced that agreement had been reached
between the governments of Canada, the United States, and Mexico to negotiate Chile's entry into
NAFrA by 1 January 1996. The announcement was made at the Summit of the Americas conference
in Miami, Florida in December 1994, where the thirty-four participant countries also agreed to work
toward a western hemispheric free trade area and complete such work by 2005. Chile's entry into
NAFrA has been sidelined by the 1996 American presidential campaign. In the interim, Canada and
Chile have entered into a bilateral trade accord, signed 18 November 1996.
17 Intra-Southeast Asian trade and investment has grown rapidly since the early 1970s. In
1970, the aggregate value of Japan's trade with Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines was half of its trade with North America. By
1989, Japan's trade in Asia surpassed that in North America. As a ratio of investment to GNP,
Japanese investment in the above Asian countries was 8.3 times its investment in the EC and four
times its investment in North America. See E. Terry, "New empire created as Tokyo moves south"
The [Toronto] Globe &Mail (26 February 1990) BI and B13. See also "A Survey of the Yen Block:
Together under the Sun" The Economist (15 July 1989) 1.
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8 which act as a "conditioning device"19 effectively
regimes, M
to foreclose
as viable public policy options any interventionist initiatives which might
violate the fundamental quasi-constitutional norm of liberalized trade.

B. New Patternsof RelationsBetween the State and Civil Society
Thus, virtually all advanced industrialized states, willingly or
under duress, are committed to policies designed to privatize,
deregulate, and liberalize their economies. Global trade regimes,
regional economic integration, and domestic neo-liberalism have been
mutually reinforcing, if not consciously orchestrated. Their combined
effect has been to transform the relations between the state and civil
society. In practical terms, government now has at best a weakened
capacity to pursue social policies through public initiatives or
institutions, or to conduct, stimulate, channel, or regulate economic
activity. There is no longer much that the state can do by way of
economic policy, beyond maintaining macroeconomic stability and
enforcing "the rules of the microeconomic game."20 Specifically, states
are no longer able to use Keynesian strategies to manage their domestic
economies or to insulate them from the vicissitudes of international
markets, as they did for much of the post-war period.
It must be said that the erosion of the Keynesian welfare state,
and the ensuing transformation of state-civil society relations, is
attributable neither to globalization and regional economic integration
alone nor to the liberalization of national economies which these entail.
Separate from-but supportive of-these developments has been the
growth of neo-conservatism and of the atavistic populisms with which it
is allied. These movements, now ascendant in the United States, contest
the very notion that governments have a right and a duty to act as they
have been doing at least since the time of the New Deal-purposefully
and proactively, through innovative legislation, to achieve the greatest

18 D. Trubek, "Social Justice 'After' Globalization: Transnational Agency, International
Regimes and the Deep Integration of Economies" (Paper presented at the University of Toronto
Law School and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, November 1995) [unpublished].
19 Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 6. This is not to imply that the nation-state is inevitably
pass6. For a defence of the nation-state's efficacy and continuing relevance, see R. Boyer & D.
Drache, eds., StatesAgainst Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996).
20
Boyer & Drache, eds., supra note 19 at 34-35.
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good for the greatest number 21 Political elites, experts, bureaucracies,
22 All of
and interventionist strategies are all in bad odour these days
this has obvious implications for law and legal institutions, especially
those closely identified with the activist state.
Further, contemporaneous with the liberalization of domestic
and international trade, states have been liberalizing in a juridical sense.
Their capacity to use their coercive and regulatory powers has also been
"hollowed out" by the adoption or reinvigoration of self-denying
ordinances such as charters of rights, which constitutionally constrained
their right to implement certain kinds of regulatory regimes. 23 Finally,
centripetal and centrifugal forces have combined to further disempower
the legal institutions of the state. On the one side, supranational entities
such as the GATr, the European Union (Eu), and NAFTA constrain the
capacity of member states to act unilaterally and in response to what
they define as their own best interests. On the other side, regional and
ethno-cultural entities are aggressively asserting the right to make their
own social and economic policies within their own space and in their
own interest, without interference from the containing state.
To summarize, more and more activities-especially those
related to economic activity-are being moved beyond the reach of state
intervention, with a corresponding expansion of the scope of
individual-especially entrepreneurial-action. Within the residual area
of state competence, various constraints-internal and external, legal
and political-are further disabling the state and to that extent
expanding the scope of civil society. 24

21 We do not mean to deflect the critique of the New Deal and other interventionist
legislation, to the effect that it had the effect of de-radicalizing social movements and incorporating
them more effectively within the assumptions and structures of capitalism. In the labour sector, see
especially K. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal

Consciousness 1937-1941" (1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265; and J.B. Atleson, "Law and Union Power:
Thoughts on the United States and Canada" (1994) 42 Buffalo L. Rev. 463.
22 See H.W. Arthurs, "'Mechanical Arts and Merchandise': Canadian Public Administration
in the New Economy" (1996) McGill L.J. [forthcoming].
23 M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed.

(Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994); HIJ. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics
in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Stud.
84; HJ. Glasbeek, "Some Strategies for an Unlikely Task: The Progressive Use of Law" (1989) 21

Ottawa L. Rev. 387; and L. Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From
Consent to Coercion Revisited, rev. ed. (Toronto: Garamond, 1988) c. 4.
24 As we will indicate in Part III, below, there are also fields in which state power is expanding,

rather than contracting.
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C. A New Techno-Economic Paradigm
The new economy also encompasses an emerging "technoeconomic paradigm," the summation of widespread changes from
Fordist to flexible modes of production. 25 The Fordist paradigm of
standardized, mass manufacturing has broken down because of its
limited capacity to respond to greater differentiation and volatility of
market demand, which requires shorter production runs, quicker
retooling, and economies of scope and specialization, as well as scale.
These new production requirements are being facilitated by
computerization and other developments in information and
telecommunication technologies, which promote efficiency and make
batch production more feasible? 6 Furthermore, a rapidly changing
international division of labour from the mid-1970s onward has made
many core Fordist manufacturing operations in Western countries
uncompetitive, resulting in the transfer of many routinized processes to
the newly industrializing countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia.
Finally, dramatic change has not been confined to the manufacturing
sector. Analogous developments have occurred in the service sector,
which has assumed increasing predominance in all advanced economies.
Changes in the processes of production have obviously affected
the social organization of work, and especially industrial relations. The
resulting stresses have been exacerbated by the inability of unions to
penetrate the rapidly growing service sector and by the state's
abandonment of its regulatory and social welfare functions. The net
result is that Fordist-style industrial relations have been largely confined
to their traditional-but shrinking-strongholds in the primary and
secondary manufacturing sectors, and to the public sector, itself under
27
considerable stress for reasons noted.
All over the world, over the past twenty years, the erosion of
standardized, mass manufacturing has triggered intense and extensive

25

For a definition of Fordism, see Boyer, supranote 7.

26 M.J. Piore & C.F. Sabel, The Second IndustrialDivide: Possibilitiesfor Prosperity(New York:

Basic Books, 1984). We are not implying that the "new economy" emerged simply because it was
technically possible. Technological innovations emerge within a broader social and political
context. In this case, to facilitate production strategies for a limited set of large corporations, their
sponsors, allies, and clienteles. These corporate strategies, in turn, required "liberalization" of long-

standing arrangements for the orderly adjustment of international fiscal, monetary, and trade
relations.
27
H.W. Arthurs, "Labour Law Without the State?" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 1 (hereinafter "Labour
Law"].
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restructuring, rationalization, and internationalization. These processes

may be global, but they have not resulted in universal outcomes.
Restructuring has, more often than not, fallen short of a full-fledged

transition to what is commonly referred to as "flexible production.

28

The more typical outcomes are varieties of "neo-Fordism," 2 9 that is,

complex hybrids of Fordism and flexible production, often organized
across sectoral, regional, and national spaces. This heterodoxy appears
to be rooted in history and culture,3 0 the institutional-political context of

28 Flexible manufacturing is ideally defined by a number of interrelated elements, many
pioneered by the Japanese. First is a heavy reliance on technical innovations, such as information
technology, computer-aided design and manufacturing technology, and numerically controlled
machine tools and robots. These facilitate quick reprogramming of assembly line equipment and
smaller batch production without sacrificing efficiency. Second, assembler-supplier relations
become close, collaborative networks, instead of arm's-length, competitive links. This requires
greater trust, essential for just-in-time (Irr) delivery of parts and supplies to manufacturers. Third,
industrial relations are qualitatively restructured. Multi-purpose machinery requires more multiskilled, highly trained workers, usually organized in work teams. Workers progressively acquire
responsibility for total quality control and practice a highly sophisticated learning-by-doing on the
job. See R. Boyer, "Capital-Labor Relations in oEcD Countries: From the Fordist 'Golden Age' to
Contrasted National Trajectories" (Paper presented at the wiDoR Project on Capital-Labor
Relations, Harvard University, 1989) [hereinafter "Capital-Labour Relations; unpublished]; and
Piore & Sabel, supra note 26.
29 Neo-Fordism, at least in the North American case, generally encapsulates the uneven,
problematic nature of the transitions to flexible manufacturing. More progress has generally been
made in the introduction of new technologies, the reorganization of manufacturer-supplier
networks, irT inventory control and delayering of middle management. On the other hand,
industrial relations in North America remain adversarial, perhaps even more in the aftermath of
NAFrA; Fordist-style collective bargaining in most core industries remains the norm, albeit one on
the defensive; and most unions and management distrust work teams (unions for fear of a
weakening of labour's power on the shop floor and increased managerial control; management for
the opposite reason). See Boyer, supra note 7; S. Wood, "The Transformation of Work?" in S.
Wood, ed., The Transformation of Work? Skill Flexibility and the Labour Process (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989) 1; D. Drache & R. Boyer, "Introduction" in Drache & Boyer, eds.,supra note 19, 1 at
16-17; R. Kreklewich, "North American Integration and Industrial Relations: Neoconservatism and
Neo-Fordism?" in R. Grinspun & M.A. Cameron, eds., The PoliticalEconomy of North American
Free Trade (New York: St. Martin's, 1993) 261; D. Drache, "Lean Production in Japanese Auto
Transplants in Canada" (1994) Can. Bus. Econ. 45; and D. Drache, "New Work and Employment
Relations: Lean Production in Japanese Auto Transplants in Canada" in Drache & Boyer, eds.,
supranote 19,227.
30 The specific nature of the post-Fordist compromise across countries in Europe and North
America very much built upon the varying manner in which capital, labour, and the state coalesced
during the previous decades of the Keynesian compromise. See Boyer, supra note 7; "Capital-Labor
Relations," supra note 28; and E.H. Lorenz, "Trust and the Flexible Firm: International
Comparisons" (1992) 31 Indus. Rel. 455. For a historical examination of the Canadian post-war
compromise, see J. Jenson, "Representations in Crisis: the Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordism"
(1990) 23 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 653.
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restructuring, 31 the varying strengths of key actors,32 the changing role of
the state,33 and a region's or country's location within the structure of
the global economy.3 4 However, in specific circumstances, despite the
centrifugal forces which have spun manufacturing out to the peripheral
economies of the third world, a centripetal force also seems to be at

play. There is a logical affinity between the newly emerging regional
economic spaces and neo-Fordist production,35 which depends on tightly
31 One need only contrast the European mode of integration with that of North America. The
latter mode of integration, via NAFrA, is promoting a restructuring process that is indelibly neoliberal. See Grinspun & Kreklewich, supra note 6. Restructuring in the European context remains
more attentive to preserving the identity of social markets. See H.G. Mosley, "The Social
Dimension of European Integration" (1990) 129 Int'l Lab. Rev. 147; M. Rhodes, "The Social
Dimension after Maastricht: Setting a New Agenda for the Labour Market" (1993) 9 Int'l J. Comp.
Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 297; B. Bercusson, "Social Policy at the Crossroads: European Labour Law
after Maastricht" in R. Dehousse, ed., EuropeAfter Maastricht:AnEver Closer Union? (Miinchen:
Law Books in Europe, 1994) 149; and W. Hutton, The State We're In (London: Jonathan Cape,
1995) c. 4.
32
Particularly important is the balance of power between capital and labour and the extent to
which either is integrated in a tripartite corporatist fashion institutionally with the state. In general,
the less the prevalence of tripartite corporatist structures, the more likely integration will proceed
on a neo-liberal basis. The United States is perhaps the prime example.
33 Global economic recession by the early 1980s exacerbated the indebtedness of most
Western countries. This, along with the liberalization of global trade and finance which rendered
interventionist policies and state institutions innocuous, led to the erosion of the Keynesian welfare
state. This process is referred to, possibly hyperbolically, as the "hollowing out" of the state. See B.
Jessop, "Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political
Economy" (1993) 40 Stud. Pol. Econ. 7; and D. Held "Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global
System" (1991) 20 Econ. & Soc'y 138. The central point here, though, is that this inoculation of the
state has been an uneven one. The erosion of the Keynesian welfare state is much more apparent in
North America than in Germany or Japan. In the United States, the state has become a powerful
force in promoting a realignment of social forces and enforcing a series of policies compatible with
broader neo-liberal projects of restructuring and internationalizing production, largely through
privatization and deregulation. This has influenced the policy direction in Canada and Mexico.
34 For example, NAFTA represents more of a conditioning framework for Mexico and Canada
than it does for the United States, given the respective asymmetries of power in North America.
The United States can, if it wishes, withstand trade friction and holds the larger trump cards in the
form of (a) investment capital and (b) access to its larger market over its smaller neighbours.
Canada and Mexico remain "price-takers" not "price-makers" with respect to the nature of
restructuring implied by NAFTA.
35 C. Sabel, "Flexible Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies" in P.
Hirst & J. Zeitlin, eds., Reversing IndustrialDecline? IndustrialStructure and Policy in Britainand her
Competitors (Oxford: Berg, 1989) 17; M. Storper & A.J. Scott, "The Geographical Foundations and
Social Regulation of Flexible Production Complexes" in J. Wolch & M. Dear, eds., Territoryand
Social Reproduction (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988); M. Storper & A.J. Scott, eds., Production,
Work,Territory: The GeographicalAnatomyofIndustrialCapitalism (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986);
D. Wolfe, "The Wealth of Regions: Rethinking Industrial Policy" (Working Paper No. 10)
(Toronto: Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, May 1994); and R. Putnam, Making
Democracy Work- Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
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knit webs of manufacturer-suppliers and just-in-time (JIT) inventory
control. These devices generate incentives for more intense regional
concentration of production without altering the need for global
36
distribution networks for final products or services.
However, whether the forces are centripetal or centrifugal, we
are clearly witnessing an erosion of the post-war transnational
corporation with its branch plant subsidiaries, standardized product
lines, and relatively static production processes. This erosion coincides
with the decline of the Keynesian welfare state,3 7 and, to an extent, the
two are connected. Because the old Fordist companies were the
dominant mode of industrial production, they also exercised a
paradigmatic influence on the social organization of work and on public
policies related to work. They were, moreover, a primary source of jobs,
tax revenues, and civic largesse and leadership. Not least, they were
both the subject and object of fiscal and monetary policies. And, as all
of these state and private institutions and strategies are changing, so too
are the legal structures which were meant to give them effect.
What, then, is the new techno-economic paradigm? The
heterogenous nature of neo-Fordism and other hybrid forms makes it
difficult to discern unidirectional labour market changes. However, at
least two broad tendencies seem to be emerging.
First, stratification both within and amongst firms is becoming
more pronounced. Within larger firms, the relatively privileged and
hitherto quite stable "core" of employees (those protected by long-term
tenure, large unions, and strong collective agreements) is shrinking in
size relative to an expanding "periphery" of less securely tenured, less
well-paid, more narrowly trained, and lower skilled employees. The
latter group bears the brunt of downsizing, cost-cutting, and
rationalization initiatives, though like the "core" itself, even the new
technostructure and middle management are by no means immune. As
amongst firms, not all enterprises have fared equally well in the new
economy. Some-generally large, diversified companies-have been
1993). The phrase "regional economic spaces" refers to both subnational and supranational
regions. Within regional free trade areas, the presence of a national border is no longer an obstacle
to the formation of neo-Fordist networks of production.
36 These tendencies are apparent in the North American automotive industry. See J.M.
Rubenstein, "Changing Distribution of the American Automobile Industry" (1986) 76 Geographical
Rev. 288; A. Mair, R. Florida & M. Kenney, "The New Geography of Automobile Production:
Japanese Transplants in North America" (1988) 64 Econ. Geography 352; and A.K. Glasmeier &
R.E. McCluskey, "U.S. Auto Parts Production: An Analysis of the Organization and Location of a
Changing Industry" (1987) 63 Econ. Geography 142.
37 M. Storper, "Industrialization and the Regional Question in the Third World: Lessons of
Postimperialism; Prospects of Post-Fordism" (1990) 14 Int'l J.Urban & Reg. Res. 423.
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able to withstand competitive pressures and restructure quite
dramatically; -they have aggressively maintained or consolidated their
market shares.
Others-including many small to medium
businesses-must retreat into specialized niches and slash costs and
profit margins in order to survive. This explains the prominence of small
business as a major source of new jobs-however ephemeral-and the
proliferation of self-employed consultants and service providers.
The result is more diverse and segmented labour markets.
"Core" and "periphery" no longer connote easily defined spatial
locations; now they signify favoured and disfavoured segments of the
economy, groups of firms within given sectors, and elements within
firms.
Second, the workplace itself is becoming more fragmented
spatially and functionally, particularly in the service sector. The
liberalization of trade rules governing many service industries under
NAFrA and the Uruguay Round of GATT has facilitated the spatial
dimension of fragmentation; new technologies have made possible the
functional dimension. As a result, service corporations are able to
decentralize production regionally or globally, often by subcontracting
out particular components of work.38 This shifts the political risks and
social costs of adjustment more broadly across geographical areas with
the added benefit (for management) of not losing central strategic
control over the entire work process. 3 9 Personal computers, faxes, and
modems have made it possible for a significant fraction of the service
sector workforce to work either full-time or part-time at home, instead
of commuting to the office. And finally, neo-Fordist restructuring is
neither gender-nor racially-neutral. Fragmentation of the labour
market also takes place along demographic fault lines with disfavoured

38 The insurance industry in Canada and the United States, for example, is well.known for
subcontracting out low value-added data-processing work to low-wage southern American states or

Mexico. Within Canada, New Brunswick-an area of chronic unemployment, with relatively low
labour standards-has upgraded its phone system to enable it to become a continental centre for
telemarketing and other phone-based business procedures. Subcontracting in the North American
automotive industry has contributed to a disparity between productivity and real wages. See S.
Head, "The New Ruthless Economy" New YorkReview of Books (29 February 1996).
39 Governments themselves have contributed to this fragmentation process.

It is now

technologically possible to locate departments or functionally specific units of ministries in any
region of the country or province. For example, consider the location of the GsT-processing unit at
Summerside, Prince Edward Island.
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groups-including immigrants and young people-often relegated to
non-standard, occasionally illegal, conditions of employment. 40
In the long term, stratification and fragmentation might
represent either a potential rallying point or a formidable barrier for
labour unions and other social movements, in their efforts to influence
the shape of the new techno-economic paradigm. To date, it has been
very much the latter. The results have become part of our everyday
experience: static or diminishing wage rates; high levels of
unemployment reaching across all categories of employment;
downsizing, closures, and relocations leading to disruption of family and
community life; and, predictably, social and political tensions.
Whether, in the long run, a prosperous new economy will emerge
from the travails of the old remains to be seen. Whatever its other
consequences, however, it is already clear that the new paradigm of
production and the social relations of work more-or-less captures the
new environment, the new formative influences, which are changing
important aspects of law and the legal system.
D. Implications
These diverse, dynamic, and inchoate developments we call the
new economy will obviously be a catalyst for changes in law, legal
institutions, and the legal profession. As a preface to the next section of
this essay, we suggest that a crude taxonomy of those changes might
characterize them as either responsive or reflexive. Responsive changes,
in our taxonomy, are those which are driven by the need to address the
juridical and institutional implications of economic, political, social, and
other trends associated with the new economy. Reflexive changes are
those which seem to be occurring within law, legal institutions, and the
legal profession as they themselves experience, learn from, and adapt to
changes which parallel those occurring in the larger society.
Amongst the responsive changes are the need to develop and
administer new structures and techniques of governance, embracing
state, supra-state, sub-state, non-state, corporate, community, and hybrid
institutions. New forms of property which are characteristic of the new
economy, especially new forms of intangible property, must be created,
disseminated, and regulated. New social relations, often shaped by the

40 J.A. Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization: The Challenge of Equity for Labour
Relations Policy" in J. Brodie, ed., Women and PublicPolicy in Canada (Toronto: Harcourt Brace,
1996) 57.
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harsh consequences of a stratified and fragmented economy, must be
mediated by new processes of dispute resolution, and new juridical
concepts.
Reflexive changes are obviously in part directly traceable to
responsive changes. A new techno-economic paradigm which implicates
the creation of new property regimes also implicates, as it were, the
creation of a new category of juridical technicians. Some reflexive
changes are, however, less directly related to external stimuli. New
computer technology, for example, changes the legal needs of global
corporations, but also makes possible changes in the production of law,
in the way in which law firms and other law experts do their work, in the
structure and operation of internal labour markets in law firms and
other sites of legal activity, in their capital structure, and in their ability
to serve increasingly dispersed, fragmented, and volatile client markets.
As a consequence, globalization, stratification, and fragmentation are all
becoming increasingly prominent features of the law "industry."
The following sections of this paper trace these responsive and
reflexive changes first by considering the production of law, then by
looking at the social relations of production, and finally by focusing
more intensively on one specific site of those relations, the legal
profession itself.
III. THE PRODUCTION OF LAW
Law has long been regarded as the state's conventional strategy
for social control and regulation, the former term being understood to
refer to disciplining the poor and powerless, 41 the latter to constraining
the market behaviour of the rich and powerful. Rather recently, law has
also come to be viewed as an important strategy for social
transformation and structural change because of its close association
with the coercive power of the state, and apart from that power, because
of its importance as a powerful symbol and cultural force. 42 However,
the advent of the new economy forces us to reconsider each of these
manifestations of law.
41

For a recent contribution to the cultural history of the idea of law as oppression and lawyers
as its agents, see Y. Castan, F. Lebrun & R. Chartier, "Figures of Modernity" in R. Chartier, ed., A
History of Private Life: Passions of the Renaissance, vol. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1989) at 122-23.
42 For a brilliant exposition of the uses and expectations of law, see R.A. MacDonald, Study
Paperon Prospectsfor Civil Justice, Ontario Law Reform Commission (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1995).
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Globalization-a defining' characteristic of the new
economy-complicates social control. Domestic social control is easy
enough to prescribe, if not to achieve. Indeed, governments are
apparently infatuated with the possibilities these days, as they adopt
draconian strategies to suppress crime, enforce "family values," exclude
unwanted immigrants, and punish welfare recipients. However, an
effective attack on globalized crime-on money laundering, arms
smuggling, or sex tourism-would require not only resuscitation and
extension of state law but unprecedented supra-state initiatives in law
making and law enforcement. The retrenchment of the state's
regulatory power-another feature of the new economy-creates a
conundrum. Those with faith in the global marketplace may rejoice in
the notion that businesses can escape the reach of regulation by shifting
operations and assets abroad. But even its most ardent devotees surely
cannot wish or imagine that in a global marketplace, there will be no
norms, no means of creating them, no means of securing compliance. It
is one thing to gloat over the inability of governments to collect taxes or
control currency flows, and quite another to tell exporters that they
cannot collect for goods shipped, patentees that they cannot protect
their inventions, unpaid bond houses that they cannot bring to book
twenty-eight-year-old rogue traders, and investors that they cannot
safeguard their money against state confiscation. And so with
technology and its capacity to trump state regulation: true, in the new
economy, governments cannot shield their citizens from satellite
transmissions which rain down foreign politics, commerce, smut, or
culture; but by the same token they cannot protect them from foreign
overfishing, acid rain, or nuclear accidents.
In short, there are many positive reasons why even enthusiasts
for the new economy might wish to populate it with serviceable legal
regimes of regulation and social control. And despite globalization,
despite the weakening of state regulation, despite new technologies, it is
quite possible to imagine how this demand for law might be satisfied. It
is not simply a matter of the wish being father to the thought or necessity
the mother of invention. Several strands of socio-legal scholarship
already attest to versions of the proposition that law never was produced
exclusively, or even primarily, by the state. 43 Using insights derived from

43
Bourdieu, supra note 2; and Teubner, supra note 4. For a dissaggregation of the variety of
state-society relations at a meso or sectoral level, see W.D. Coleman & G. Skogstad, "Policy
Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Approach" in W.D. Coleman & G. Skogstad, eds.,
Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canda:A StructuralApproach (Mississauga, Ont.: Copp
Clark Pitman, 1990) 14. See also, generally, supra note 3.
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this scholarship, we will examine how law is being produced in the new
economy, both within the state and elsewhere.
In effect, we will examine how the new economy reshapes an
industry with an unusually high proportion of knowledge workers, whose
product is the norms of social behaviour. In the current vernacular, the
production of law can be described as increasingly "lean" and "flexible,"
high value-added and intensely competitive, and functionally and
spatially diffuse. Law production is characterized by technical
innovations, or more accurately, by changes in the mix and relative
importance of several pre-existing modes of production. These
innovations or changes include: the emergence of multiple sources of
law within the state, increased transnational production of legal norms,
greater competition between state and non-state producers of law, the
privatization of state legal functions, hybridization, and
juridification-the penetration of law and legalism into domains
previously governed by other forms of social ordering. Each of these
phenomena will be reviewed briefly.
A. The Productionof Law by CompetingAgencies of the State
As is now well understood-everywhere except in fundamentalist
legal circles-state law is produced not only by the legislature but by the
executive and judicial branches of government. Not surprisingly, given
their differing mandates and make-ups, various agencies and organs of
government are frequently at odds over whose law will prevail, and
whose will authoritatively define social values, express public policies,
and regulate personal behaviours. Debates about the "rule of law," the
proper scope of judicial review and judicial independence, the strict and
liberal approaches to statutory interpretation, the presumptively limited
character and scope of delegated legislative and judicial functions,
proportionality or overreach when government action is reviewed under
the Charter,cabinet's domination of or accountability to Parliament, and
the contestability of administrative discretion and policy guidelines are
all, in fact, debates amongst the many legal institutions of the state over
whose law will prevail in what circumstances. They are, in essence,
debates about who may use state law as an instrument of social control
and regulation, and on what terms.
Of course, law has not always been used instrumentally to
advance the purposes of the state. On the contrary, in the AngloAmerican tradition, law also portrays itself as a shield against oppression
by the state. And not just as a shield: from the very beginnings of
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regulation in Victorian England, judges have used law as a sword to hack

away at effective state intervention in the market place. 4 4 These
contradictions in the use of state law-to regulate and to defeat

regulation-have persisted in the United Kingdom, 45 Canada, 46 and the
United States-notoriously so during the New Deal47 -and more
recently in the European Community.48 Indeed, they became embedded
in the regulatory apparatus of the Fordist state and were one cause of its
limited effectiveness. However, the contradictions have recently
intensified.
This has come about in a rather unexpected way.

Litigation

under the American Bill of Rights,49 often undertaken defensively up to
the 1930s to forestall regulation, began to be used creatively-and with

apparent success-during the post-war period, and especially during the
1960s and 1970s, to expand civil rights and to promote various
progressive projects of social transformation. Understandably,
marginalized groups in other countries began to demand access to
comparable legal technologies with which to empower themselves.
These demands were responded to with some genuine liberal
idealism-and perhaps also a degree of cynicism. The result was a
44 H.W. Arthurs, "Without the Law": Administrative Justice & Legal Pluralism in NineteenthCentury England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
45 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. by E.C.S. Wade (London: Macmillan,
1959); and G.B. Hewart, The New Despotism, rev. ed. (London: Ernest Benn, 1945). Modern
critiques include W.G. Friedmann, The State and the Rule of Law in a Mixed Economy (London:
Stevens, 1971); R.F. Heuston, Essays in ConstitutionalLaw, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1964); and J.
Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual and the
Functional" (1935) 1 U.T.LJ. 53.
46 Ontario, FirstReport of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1968) [hereinafter McRuer Report]. For a critique of the McRuer Report, see H.W.
Arthurs, "Jonah and the Whale: The Appearance, Disappearance, and Reappearance of
Administrative Law" (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 225 at 237-39 [hereinafter "Jonah and the Whale"].
47 New Deal legislation, particularly that which would expand the state's administrative
functions, was weakly embraced, at best, and often opposed by most segments of the American legal
community: solo practitioners and small firm lawyers, on grounds of overcrowding and fears of
competition from lay practitioners; and corporate lawyers, on grounds that administrative agencies
would erode the "centrality of federal courts in the resolution of disputes." See R. Shamir,
"Professionalism and Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and Administrative Law, 1933-1937" (1993)
27 Law & Soe'y Rev. 361 at 377. Protagonists were federal government lawyers, examined in great
detail in P.H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1982). For
a superb examination of the tensions and ambiguities in Wagner's progressive cooperative vision,
see M. Barenberg, "The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation" (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379 at 1489-96.
48 "Labour Law," supra note 27 at 7, note 18.
49

U.S. Const. amends. I-X.
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proliferation of constitutional documents such as the European
Convention of Human Rights5 ° and the CanadianCharter of Rights and
Freedoms.5 1
During the debates over adoption of Canada's Charter, an
attempt was made to lay to rest concerns that it might be used-as its
American progenitor had earlier been used-to inhibit market
regulation 5 2 Nonetheless, on several occasions since its adoption in
1982, it has been used precisely for that purpose 5 3 although the direct
juridical consequences have been rather limited. More important than
these juridical consequences, however, have been the indirect effects of
the Charter on our political culture. By subordinating the decisions of
elected parliaments to judicial review, the Charterhas helped to weaken
confidence in electoral politics. By reinforcing the notion of society as
an aggregation of autonomous, rights-bearing individuals, it has helped
to delegitimate collectivist or communitarian ideologies. By making all
'legislation and administrative action subject to open-ended judicial
review, it has provided a tactical weapon for anti-state and antiinterventionist litigants. And by raising the litigation stakes, thereby
lowering the efficiency of regulation, the Charter has created
disincentives for even the most interventionist-minded governments to
pursue their strategies through state law and legal processes.
The Charter obviously did not initiate the use of law to attack
regulation, nor did its architects necessarily envisage that its adoption
would hasten Canada's incorporation into the new global economy.
Indeed, the Charter was arguably an effect, not a cause, of public
disenchantment with parliamentary politics, state intervention, and big
government. But whatever its provenance, the Charterhas in fact helped
to transform state-civil society relations, and to create a friendlier
environment for all those private interests which the state might
54
formerly have sought to regulate and constrain.

50 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force 21 September 1970).
51

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,

c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
52 For example, the original draft of the Charterdid include a provision for property rights; in
the aftermath of hearings over the Charterthis provision was omitted in later drafts and in the final
text, despite the objections of the business community. See Mandel, supra note 23 at 308.
53 Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),

[1994] 1 S.C.R. 311.
54

Mandel, supra note 23; Glasbeek, supra note 23; and Panitch & Swartz, supra note 23.
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B. States and the TransnationalProductionof Legal Norms
As noted, the new economy has been characterized by the
emergence of strong regional trade blocs and the globalization of
production and financial markets. To a degree, these developments
represent an extrapolation of previous practices, and they are still more
visible in some sectors than others. However, the trajectory is so
extreme, and the potential implications so profound, that it is necessary
to consider whether, and if so how, states can produce legal norms with
transnational efficacy.-"
A state's law usually stops at its borders. When the parties to a
transaction are in different countries, they may agree to be bound by the
state law of either country or of a third (not necessarily their own), or by
norms agreed between the parties or established by a trade association
or other private institution.5 6 States can, in principle, extend the reach
of their legislation at least to regulate locally based corporations doing
business in foreign countries, but they are limited by the extraterritoriality principle and by practical difficulties of detection and
enforcement abroad. Even more important, the plausible threat by a
major corporation to shift its activities to another country is enough to
persuade all but the most determined or powerful states to abandon or
modify their regulatory exertions.
Obviously, states can collaborate to organize transnational
regulatory action through simple bilateral treaties, juridically complex
and fecund multilateral regimes such as the EU and GATT (now the wTo),
or specific international conventions such as those on child labour,
trademarks, or maritime safety. But these treaties, regimes, and
conventions are seldom universal, and often lack effective agencies of
enforcement. Consequently, compliance depends largely upon the
willingness and ability of individual states to enforce them.
57
Enforcement, in many cases, is neither assiduous nor effective.
Indeed, governments may sometimes collude in immunizing
corporations from the reach of both their own laws and the laws of other
5-5 For an interesting typology of attempts to extend the reach of state law beyond national
boundaries, see K. Stone, "Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational
Labor Regulation" (1995) 16 Michigan J. Int'l L. 987.
56
Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2.
57 By way of example to the contrary, a German court recently ordered CompuServe, one of
the commercial gatekeepers of the Internet, to terminate the access privileges of users who
purveyed pornography. CompuServe, an American company, complied, presumably at least in part
because its German operations were within the reach of the Court's enforcement procedures.
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states. Examples include ships which fly "flags of convenience," small
countries whose incorporation and banking laws shelter offshore
investors from their tax liabilities, and the de jure and de facto
immunities from labour standards, environmental legislation, and local
taxation which some jurisdictions use as bait to lure potential investors.
In fact, the ability of states to produce domestic legal regimes is
sometimes the basis of competition between them to attract investment
by creating unusually favourable conditions for particular markets, as in
the case of the "big bang" which deregulated the London financial
markets in 1986, or particular types of manufacturing operations, such as
the Mexican maquiladora plants. The point is not that any of these
represent radical departures from past practice: all have long-standing
precedents. Rather, it is that states now pursue these strategies within a
framework of belief and practice which stresses the virtues of both
globalization and deregulation. The consequence is that powerful
supranational corporations are relatively free to produce their own law,
their own normative systems, and to impose them on customers,
suppliers, and workers8-even on governments.
On the other hand, the relative legal autonomy of global
corporations can also be overestimated. In the new economy, they may
ignore the law of their home country; with the connivance of host
governments, they may use foreign law in their own interest; indeed,
they may even become a law unto themselves. But there is also historical
evidence that relatively powerless communities-E.P. Thompson's
commoners and plebeian crowds,5 9 for example, or local merchants in
rural Quebec,60 or the peasants of Chiapas-may retain some vestigial
capacity to generate their own norms, some limited capacity to modify,
deflect, even occasionally defeat, the law of the state or of powerful
corporate interests.
To generalize from this point, the question of which law-of
whose law-will prevail in any contestation between rival systems is, we
contend, an empirical question; it cannot be answered a priori by
reference to general principles of national or international law. In
consequence, debates over which strategies ought to be adopted to
regulate the activities of global corporations beyond the boundaries of
58 P.B. Meyer, "General Motors' Saturn Plant: A Quantum Leap in Technology and Its
Implications for Labour and Community Organizing" (1986) 30 Capital & Class 73.
59 See Customs in Common: Studies in TraditionalPopularCulture (New York: The New Press,

1991).
60 J.-G. Belley, "Contrat et citoyennet6. La politique d'achat r6gional d'une entreprise
multinationale" (1993) 34 C. de D. 1063.
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their home state is also an empirical question. Regulatory strategies will
be favoured or disfavoured depending on estimates of their likely
practical outcome. State lawmaking is no longer an obvious-let alone
automatic-choice; on the basis of their limited efficacy to date, suprastate regimes must be regarded with some scepticism, and non-state
regulation may be the only recourse in given circumstances.
C. CompetitionBetween State andNon-State Producersof Law
What of non-state regimes? As studies in legal pluralism
empirically demonstrate, 61 the state does not enjoy a monopoly over the
production of law. It never did. To the contrary: as we have argued, all
institutions-broadly defined to include both state and non-state
institutions-are, by definition, sites of the production of law.
Consequently, within given institutions, various actors will contend for
control over the local process of legal production. In a government
agency-a police force, for example-front line employees may
resist-may subvert-detailed instructions legally promulgated by senior
officials; in a business organization, middle managers may develop
standard practices for dealing with consumers, suppliers, or employees
which are designed to maintain cordial relations or personal advantage,
rather than those which would maximize the firm's profitability or
minimize its legal liabilities. Furthermore, institutions may be at odds
with each other over whose law will prevail. Thus, norms produced on
the factory floor and the trading floor clash with the norms of state
regulatory regimes; indigenous norms of aboriginal and immigrant
communities clash with the norms of the dominant society, encapsulated
in criminal codes and family law statutes; norms of universities,
professional sports leagues, and churches clash with each other and with
those of the state as well.
It is impossible, in any given situation, to predict the outcome of
normative clashes within and amongst institutions. However, while the
state, in principle, can assert both might and right, non-state systems, in

61 S.F. Moore, "Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study" (1973) 7 Law & Soe'y Rev. 719; Belley, supra note 60; M. Galanter &
D. Luban, "Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages & Legal Pluralism" (1993) 42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1393; S.
Henry, PrivateJustice: Towards Integrated Theorising in the Sociology of Law (Boston: Routledge &

Kegan Paul, 1983); D. Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (London: Academic Press,
1983); B. Yngvesson, "Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction of

Community in a New England Town" (1988) 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 409; and R.C. Ellickson, Order
Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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fact, often prevail over state law, precisely because they are imbricated
within, even constitutive of, the daily life of particular institutions or
communities. Contracts and commercial law offer particularly apposite
examples of how state and non-state laws and institutions relate to each
other.
Characteristically, business transactions are governed by
contracts and, in principle, contracts are subject to state law. However,
state law may be trumped by private arrangement, of which the standard
form contract is the most ubiquitous example. Indeed, while the state
continues to assert its primacy over business custom and practice, 62 and
even over the express desire of the parties to be governed by some other
normative system, 63 the bark of state law is worse than its bite. Given
the symbolic and practical importance of freedom of contract in market
economies, the state tends to be diffident about intervening in private
transactions, so that parties are usually given considerable latitude to
"contract out" of state law or, what amounts to the same thing, to draft
around it.64 True, some recent decisions suggest that courts may prevent
the enforcement of oppressive contracts, especially where one of the
parties has diminished competence 65 or where the transaction involves
important public policies or moral principles. 6 6 But those very
circumstances often permit the stronger party to have its way with the
weaker regardless of what the contract says: "sue me" is an invitation
few people can afford to accept when it is issued by a major corporation.
Moreover, many important, long-term business relationships are
governed by "relational" contracts or simply by tacit understandings

62

For example, Employment StandardsAct,R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14.

63

Czamikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 KB. 478 (C.A.).

64 D. MeBarnet, "Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance" in M. Cain & C.B.
Harrington, eds., Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (New York: New
York University Press, 1994) 73; and L. Bernstein, "The New Law Merchant: Private Commercial
Law in the United States" Law & Economics Workshop Series WS 1994-95 (No. 9) (Toronto: Faculty
of Law, University of Toronto, 1995) at 18.
65
Particularly, if the party seeking enforcement knew of the other's mental incompetence or,
ought to have know of it. See, for example, Hartv. O'Connor,[1985] A.C. 1000 (P.C.); Hill Estate v.
Chevron StandardLtd. (1992), 74 Man. R. (2d) 162 (Q.B.); and Cameron v. Dorcic (1988), 80 N.S.R.
(2d) 152 (S.C.T.D.).
66 On these grounds, many restrictive covenants preventing business competition have been
struck down. See, for example, WI.R Grace & Co. of CanadaLtd. v. Sare (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 612
(H.C.); Alec Loeb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil Great Britain Ltd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87 (Ch.); and
Bassmanv. Deloitte Haskins & Sells of Canada (1984), 44 O.R. (2d) 329 (H.C.).
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evolved over a prolonged course of dealing. 67 Relational contracts are
in effect framework agreements, the details of which are filled in
pragmatically, as the parties work through their relationship and develop
mutual dependencies and expectations. Even in the absence of a
contractual framework, and even where the parties posess vastly
disparate power, there is evidence that their relationship is likely to be
conducted not arbitrarily, but rather in accordance with legal norms. 68
Some of these norms may be formally laid down, in internal company
policies, in ephemeral bulletins, in shipping documents; some can be
inferred only by observing patterns of conduct. But there is no necessary
correlation between such norms and the requirements of state law.
Indeed, some may explicitly contravene the requirements of state law. 69
D. Privatizationof Legal Production
It was once regarded as axiomatic that state agencies
should-and did-enjoy a monopoly over the production,
administration, and enforcement of state law. However, whatever the
previous descriptive or prescriptive validity of this assumption, in the
new economy the situation is clearly changing. As part of a general
demand to reduce and "reinvent" government,70 a number of initiatives
have begun to impinge upon even its hitherto sacrosanct core legal
functions.
Private and partially private institutions are becoming active in
the production of law, particularly in the enterprises of social control
and regulation. There has been an overt effort to shift the centre of
gravity of the justice system from state courts to systems of alternative
67

I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract:An Inquiry into Modem ContractualRelations (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980) at 72-118. For a more sociological treatment, see E.
Schanze, "Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures Between Contract and
Corporation" in C. Joerges, ed., Franchisingand the Law: Theoreticaland ComparativeApproaches
in Europe and the United States (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) 66. For a legal
pluralist treatment, see J.G. Belley, "Contract, Legal Pluralism, Global Economy and Human
Development" (Paper prepared for the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research Workshop,
Toronto, 28-29 October 1994) [unpublished].
68 S. Macauley, Law and the Balance of Power: The Automobile Manufacturers and Their
Dealers (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966); and J.-G. Belley, "Les transformations d'un
ordre juridique priv6. Les contrats d'approvisionement A l'bre de la cybern6tique et de la gestion
strat6gique" (1992) 33 C. de D. 21.
69
Moore, supra note 61.
70

1994).

MJ. Trebilcock, The Prospectsfor Reinventing Government (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,
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dispute resolution (ADR), especially private systems of mediation and
arbitration.71 In part, this effort stems from a desire to make the system
more responsive, less formal, and less costly for the litigants. However,
it is also driven by the imperative of reducing public expenditures in the
justice sector by reducing the activity level of the courts.7 2 As it turns
out, ADR may also lead to privatization, and transformation, of disputes
with an important public policy dimension 73-a by-product Of ADR which
validates the expectations of both opponents and advocates of the new
economy. The state also seems to be yielding its monopoly over the use
of force to armed citizens, 74 private security firms, 75 and the franchised
administrators of newly privatized prisons.76 And in certain regulatory
77
realms of great social and economic significance-technical standards,
7
8
79
intellectual and industrial property, and credit arrangements, for

71 For a convenient summary of developments, see G.W. Adams & N.L. Bussin, "Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Canadian Courts: A Time for Change" (1995) 17 Advocates Q. 133. A
more legal pluralist perspective is found in G.R. Woodman, "The Alternative Law of Alternative
Dispute Resolution" (1991) 32 C. de D. 3.
72 The Honourable Mr. Justice T.C. Zuber, Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry (Toronto:
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1987) at 51-53.
73

B. Garth, "Privatization and the New Market for Disputes" (1992) 12 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc'y

367.
74
While there is no constitutional or inherent legal right to bear arms in Canada, the debate
generated by modest government proposals to license firearms revealed the existence of a sizeable
body of opinion in this country apparently prepared to countenance the use of guns not just for
sport or commercial hunting, but for personal security.
75

P. O'Malley, "Legal Networks and Domestic Security" (1991) 11 Stud. in Law, Pol. & Soc.
171; and C. Shearing & P. Stenning, "Private Security: Implications for Social Control" (1983) 30
Soc. Prob. 493.
76 See J.G. Dipiano, "Private Prisons: Can they Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-First
Century" (1995) 21 New Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement 171; and N.B. Casarez, "Furthering the
Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections" (1995) 28 U. Mich. J.L. 249. On their
historical emergence in the U.K. and the United States, see D.N. Wecht, "Break the Code of
Indifference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons" (1987) 96 Yale LJ. 815.
77

L. Salter, Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards (Boston:
Kluwer Academic, 1988).
78 S. Jasanoff, Risk Managementand PoliticalCulture:A ComparativeStudy of Science in the
Policy Context (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986); S. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law,
Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); and R.
Mansell & R. Silverstone Communication by Design: The Politicsof Communication Technologies
(New York. Oxford University Press, 1996).
79 See generally Y. Dezalay & D. Sugarman, eds., ProfessionalCompetition and Professional
Power:Layers,Accountants and the Social ConstructionofMarkets (London: Routledge, 1995). See
also J. Flood & E. Skordaki, "Normative Bricolage: Informal Rule-Making by Accountants and
Lawyers in Mega-Insolvencies" in G. Teubner, ed., GlobalLaw Without the State [forthcoming].
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example-those being regulated are, in effect, more and more frequently
writing the rules of regulation.
Overall, the state's production of legal norms in many areas is
being consciously curtailed to facilitate production in the private sector.
What does this imply, in terms of the future content and consequences
of law? Generally speaking, as privatized law-making is removed further
and further from democratic institutions and the practice of democratic
politics, we can expect that the content of legal rules will more and more
closely correlate with the interests of the stronger party to any dispute or
transaction.8 0 This would hardly be surprising, since state intervention
often occurred after a political struggle, with at least the ostensible aim 81
of curbing private power.
There is some evidence for the view that the withdrawal of state
law does not lead inevitably to the introduction of privately generated
norms which are arbitrary and abusive. But enthusiasts for the new
economy do not stoop to conquer; instead, they advance theoretical or
principled arguments against state law production and in favour of
privatization. First, they argue, government by periodic elections and
brokerage politics, as practised in most Western states, is undemocratic
in fact if not in form; to disempower the state and to dismantle the
powerful and privileged apparat which controls its regimes of legal
production are necessary preconditions to the achievement of a
genuinely democratic society. Second, they urge, of all democratic
institutions, none is more perfect than the market; citizens are the most
effective guardians of their own rights and interests when they are
allowed to function as sovereign consumers, empowered by information,
given voice by technology, and protected by constitutional safeguards
and financial "realities" from any temptation to nestle into the bosom of
the state. From these propositions, it is an easy step to imagine that the
privatization of law production is an early stage on the journey to the
new New Jerusalem.
Quite apart from any concern for the advancement of
democratic values, however, clearly serious competition is developing in
both process and product between the state and private producers of law
who have inherited some part of its dominant role in production.

80 Garth, supra note 73 at 368.
81 Official justice is often arbitrary and decontextualized in its own right and intolerant of less
formal, normative legal fields: see R.A. Macdonald, "Theses on Access to Justice" (1992) 7 Can.
J.L. & Soe'y 23 at 27.
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E. Hybridization
It has been argued that we are in the midst of a process of
hybridization, in which law and legal institutions can no longer be
described accurately as belonging strictly either to the private or the
state sector, as national or as international in origin, as formal or
informal in character.8 2
The changes in the processes of legal production which we have
described-conflicts within the state legal order, transnational
production of legal norms, competition between state and non-state
regimes, and privatization-result from, or have been accelerated by, the
advent of the new economy. However, just as the new economy is
superimposed upon, and coexists with, a large remnant of the old, so too
do the characteristic legal forms of each coexist. But hybridization
suggests more than coexistence. It implies that a dynamic interaction, a
melding, of old and new legal institutions and norms is producing
something which is not quite the same as either.
Such, indeed, is the nature of many of the developments hinted
at above.
Technical product standards -are defined through
multinational negotiations which are effectively conducted and
controlled by the leading firms and their experts, but these standards are
validated by government decree and enforced both by industry
convention and government inspection. Privatized prisons continue to
house inmates who have been convicted in state courts and are being
punished in accordance with norms decreed by the state; however, the
logistics of prison administration are contracted out to private firms
mandated to use the state's coercive powers. Charter schools, supported
by state funds and held to performance standards set by the state, are
administered by private boards which usually comprise parent and
teacher representatives.
But the novelty and positive features of hybridization should not
be overstated. In a sense, hybridization has proceeded along lines which
have been visible for some time. Private interests so egregiously
influence state regulatory regimes that the phenomenon of "regulatory
capture" had become a virtual clich6 of public administration
scholarship. Informal normative regimes-negotiated justice and
paramilitary traditions, for example-were long ago observed to
function "in the shadow" of state criminal law, even inside state-run
courts, police forces, and prisons. Strong parent groups, teachers'
82

de Sousa Santos, supranote .5.
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unions, and principals were able to influence academic standards and
administrative practices in state schools, long before legislation and
charters formally gave them responsibility for school governance.
Essentially then, under pressure of the new economy, low-visibility
practices have been translated into high principle, and the state,
discovering itself to be financially and politically impoverished, has
placed itself at the disposal of its creditors. To put matters at their
highest, the "new reality"-the menacing face of the new economy-has
frightened the state into experimenting with new hybrid legal institutions
which it hopes will enable it to maintain some semblance of its former
capacity to produce and administer law.
This is at least a partial explanation of the phenomenon of
juridification, described next.
F. Juridification
It is regarded as axiomatic in a democratic society that
governments should adhere to "the rule of law"-an ill-defined
concept 8 3 which is nonetheless regarded as the mother-lode of
democratic legitimacy. In countries where the rule of law is enshrined as
a constitutional principle, it operates juridically to trump all forms of
state action. But even in countries such as Canada, where the rule of law
constitutes only the subtext of a body of discrete technical legal rules, its
impact is considerable.
It defines our political and legal sensibilities by shaping the deep
structures of normative discourse concerning not only state, but also
non-state, institutions. It leads us to expect that all agencies of the
state-not just courts-will act legally, in accordance with
predetermined and duly promulgated norms, and fairly, more or less in
accordance with curial procedures, which we take to be exemplary.
These same expectations are percolating into the private sphere, into
corporations, community movements, the arts and popular culture, even
family life. Here the cultural power, the tutelary impact, of the rule of
law has had consequences which far outstrip its technical, juridical force.
This process of extrapolating expectations of lawfulness and fairness

83 H.W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17
Osgoode Hall L. 1; and G. Teubner, "Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions" in G.
Teubner, ed., Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor,
Corporat Antitrust, and Social Welfare Law (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 3.
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from state courts to other public agencies, and from the state sphere to
private institutions, we will refer to as juridification.
Two dramatic examples from the public sector illustrate the
power of the rule of law. In 1963, the Conservative government of
Ontario introduced what became known as the "notorious Police Bill,"8 4
a relatively innocuous statute designed to enhance the power of the
Ontario Police Commission to attack organized crime. The Bill was
attacked so vigorously by the opposition Liberal party, and by civil
libertarians, editorial writers, and legal organizations, that an abashed
government appointed a Royal Commission on Civil Rights (the
McRuer Commission) to identify and to extirpate all violations of the
rule of law to be found in the Ontario statutes. The McRuer
Commission reported in 1968.85 Its consequences were various: the
amendment of literally hundreds of statutes; no discernible change in
the freedom experienced by Ontario citizens; exponential growth in
delay, cost, and inefficiency within the provincial administrative
apparatus; and, to the extent that that apparatus became inoperable, the
86
enhanced immunity of business from state regulation.
Three decades later, in 1994, legislation was introduced by a new
federal Liberal government which reversed the recent privatization, in
dubious circumstances by an expiring Conservative government, of the
Toronto airport. The legislation also deprived the new private owners of
what they regarded as their legitimate expectation of profits. This
statute-which, after all, sought to restore the previous boundary
between state and civil society-was denounced as a violation of the rule
of law almost universally, not just by conservatives, journalists, and the
business community, but by lawyers of all stripes, including academics
and government supporters and advisors. The government, having
already agreed to amendments designed to deflect the criticism, now
seems likely to retreat even further in the face of a court challenge8 7 and
an investigation by the Conservative-dominated Senate. The result is
likely to be delay in the regeneration of an important public facility with
attendant inconvenience and business losses for users, windfall profits
84 Bill 157,AnAct to amend the PoliceAct, 4th sess., 26th Leg., Ontario, 1962-63 (1st reading
22 April 1963).
85
Supra note 46.
86 j. Willis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968) 18
U.T.L.J. 351; "Jonah and the Whale," supra note 46; and R.W. Macaulay, Directions: Review of
Ontario'sRegulatoryAgencies (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1989).
87 Ti7:2 Ltd. Partnershipv. Canada (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 81 (Gen. Div.). An appeal to the
Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed on 23 May 1995: see (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 546.
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for private entrepreneurs providentially relieved of the risks of
investment and management in a volatile industry, and-most
seriously-a generation of Canadian governments reluctant to use their
legal powers and risk their scant resources to protect the long-term
public interest. (However, no such reluctance seems likely to inhibit
governments defending other versions of the public interest against the
vested claims of trade unions or poor people.) ss
These examples of the juridification of public administration and
politics show how the production of law is a cause of the new economy as
well as an effect. Juridification does not merely plant clearer boundary
markers between the state and civil society; it makes it more difficult to
shift those markers into the private domain, or even to maintain or
restore the previous domain of the state. Moreover, the clarity of the
markers laid down by the rule of law facilitates and encourages
challenges to state "encroachments" at the same time as sensitivity to
those encroachments is being heightened by the prevalence of anti-state

rhetoric.
Ironically, however, juridification has operated to inhibit
entrepreneurial freedom within the new economy, as well as to facilitate
it. The literature of private sector management is replete with stories of
juridification, albeit seldom as far-reaching or profound as those cited
above. For example, individual and collective employment rights,8 9 and
the handling of complaints about racial or sexual harassment 90 are now

88 Thus, public sector unions have been notoriously unable to generate comparable support
for their claims that legislative repudiation of their collective agreements, and deprivation of their
expectation interests in future employment opportunities and higher wages, is a violation of the rule
of law or of any other fundamental legal norm. See Reference ReAnti-InflationAct (Canada),[1976]
2 S.C.R. 373; BCGEU v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214; Reference Re Public Service
Employee RelationsAct (Alberta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PsAc v. Canada (A.G.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424;
and opSEu v. Ontario (ManagementBoard) (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Gen. Div.). Welfare
claimants are encountering similar difficulties in protecting their entitlements and expectations
against a 20 per cent reduction by executive order during the first months of Ontario's Conservative
"common sense" revolution: Masse v. Ontario (Ministryof Community & SocialServices) (1996), 134
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Div. Ct.).
89 B. Adell, "Juridification Under Wagnerism: The Need for a Change in Direction" in A.
Giles, A.E. Smith & K. Wetzel, eds., Proceedings of the XXXIst Conference, CanadianIndustrial
RelationsAssociation,1994 (Quebec City: cnzA, 1995) 123. Compare J.Browne, The Juridificationof
the Employment Relationship (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994) at 201-02, who contends that unfair
dismissal legislation in Ireland has spurred many companies to devise company handbooks,
precisely because personnel managers have discovered that formalization of the employment
as the employee has no input to the terms of the
relationship "gives the employer greater control ...
contract."
90 For example, A.P. Aggarwal, Sex Discrimination:Employment Law & Practices(Toronto:
Butterworths, 1994) c. 9, provides a "Guide for Non-Discriminatory Hiring Policies and Practices."
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juridified in many companies well past the point required by state law.
The juridification of individual employment law has developed as an
explicit, and possibly contrived, riposte to the high level of executive
angst engendered by the uncertainties of the new economy.91 Businesses
faced with consumer claims and newspapers confronted with accusations
of journalistic malpractice have established voluntary ombudsman
procedures but these procedures-however innovative and wellpublicized-seldom generate much traffic; consumers and complainants
tend to be scornful of anything less than due process and independent
adjudication. And the juridification of personal relationships is the stuff
of scholarly comment, popular humour, and bitter experience for
spouses, lovers, and parents.
Thus, juridification underlines a paradox of the new economy.
On the one hand, state law and administration designed to regulate
corporate, institutional, and individual conduct is being reined in by
juridification-the imposition of a legalist ideology and a legalist
procedural template which is often disabling and sometimes fatal to
regulation. Furthermore, some of the state's legal functions of social
control, of norm creation and dispute resolution, are being privatized.
These developments obviously have the effect of expanding the power of
corporations and private institutions by insulating them from the state.
On the other hand, civil society and the institutions which populate it are
by no means devoid of law. On the contrary, they too have become
juridified, even though the traditional source of law-the state-is being
held at arm's length.
How to explain this paradox? The juridification of civil society,
of corporate and institutional life, is not, we argue, simply the flotsam
and jetsam left behind by a receding tide of state regulation. We offer
several alternative hypotheses.
State law is not just a form of social control. It is a cultural
artefact, a "great code" 92 which shapes the way we express ourselves, and
imprints on our mind an image of social relations which is not easily
dislodged, even when neither the state nor its law is present. A second
hypothesis: bureaucratic rationality, which we associate with state law,
and especially with regulatory institutions, is not peculiar to them. As
Max Weber reminds us, it is a mode of organizing social relations which
is common to corporate bureaucracies as well. It is a function of size,
91 L.B. Edelman, S.E. Abraham & H.S. Erlanger, "Professional Construction of Law: The
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge" (1992) 26 Law & Soe'y Rev. 47.

92 N. Frye, The Great Code: The Bible andLiterature (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1982).
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complexity, specialization of functions, hierarchy, and impersonality,
which are to be found on both sides of the divide between the state and
civil society. 93 Or, to put the same idea in non-Weberian language, it
may simply be that all social relationships abhor a normative vacuum. A
third hypothesis: juridification is not a spontaneously occurring
phenomenon; it is a project advanced by specific groups of lawyers to
increase the value of their social and intellectual capital to the prejudice
of competing law experts and other lawyersY4
And a final hypothesis: the juridification of civil society, and
especially of corporate life, is part of a conscious effort to demonstrate
that the state is unnecessary, that the privatization of its functions need
result in no impairment of the values which state action is intended to
advance. Privatized prisons are still meant to be secure and
punitive-arguably more so than the state institutions they replaced; the
rights of female employees to be treated fairly are still to be
protected-arguably more cheaply and efficiently through corporate
edicts than they would have been by employment equity legislation
administered with notorious government clumsiness.
Whatever the explanation, juridification is clearly not confined to
the state sector, and legalist ideology, that is, legalist procedural
templates, may prove to be as potentially disabling in non-state settings
as they are in government. Given that corporations and institutions
have, to a large extent, voluntarily juridified themselves, it is at least
possible that the new economy will not be as different from the old
regulated state as its proponents hope or its critics fear. Finally, this
brief look at juridification reminds us that the production of law
generates effluents and emissions-some benign, some not-which seep
into all corners of social life. Those who produce law may therefore be
the agents of consequences beyond their own intention or
comprehension. We turn next to an examination of producers of law.
IV. PRODUCERS OF LAW
We have proposed that law can be seen as an industry with a
high proportion of knowledge workers. It is now time to examine those
workers more closely.

93

G.F. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276.
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See, for example, Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2 at 49-62.
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A. Law Experts
If virtually all institutions, all significant social or economic
relations, generate law, virtually everyone is to some extent a producer
of law. However, we propose to focus on one particular set of
producers-essentially elite producers -whom we will refer to as "law
experts." 95 We use this term as a convenient and compendious way of
referring to those skilled, specialized, and strategically located
knowledge workers who contribute consciously and significantly to the
construction of the "legal field"-"the ensemble of institutions and
practices through which law is produced, interpreted and incorporated
into social decisionmaking. 9 6 Our category of law experts therefore
encompasses not only formally qualified legal practitioners and judges,
but also academics and commentators, accountants and management
consultants, non-lawyer advisors and advocates, lobbyists and policy
makers, drafters and adjudicators, and a host of other individuals doing
"law jobs" 97 both in the state sector and in institutions such as stock
exchanges, corporations, unions, universities, sports leagues, and
community groups.
Law experts tell us how to understand and work with law.
Obviously, they do not possess an autonomous power of enactment in
either the state or the private sphere, but they do tend to constitute and
control important sectors of the legal field, and to influence the making
of policy choices by their characterization of issues, by their validation of
techniques of intervention, and by their conventions of discourse. 98 This
is not to say that with their very different mandates, skills, tasks,
ideologies, and clienteles, they represent a single unified influence
95 The focus on the pre-eminent role of law experts in the new economy has two potential
limitations. First, it may underestimate the actual and potential contribution to the production of
law of non-elite producers. Second, it might be construed as privileging elite control over law, and
as failing therefore to address concerns about democratic process and values. We accept fully the
need to keep all contributions and contributors clearly in view, and to remain aware always of the

contestations between different groups of producers involved in legal production. However,
without being tautologous, it is important to recall that elite producers-law experts-are

identifiable precisely because they occupy strategic roles in law production in the new economy.
96

D.M. Trubek et aL, "Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization

of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas" (1994) 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 407 at
411.
97

For the origin of this term, see K. Llewellyn, "The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs"
(1940) 49 Yale L.J. 1355.
98
P. Bourdieu & L.J.D. Wacquant,An Invitationto Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
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within the legal field, or even that they define their roles within the
processes of law production in a similar manner. On the contrary, as has
been noted, "the forces and logics that can be observed in the economy,
the state and the international legal order are at work within the legal
field as well," 99 as contending groups struggle internally for control of
the field and interact with other fields to produce legal "outcomes.'' 0
Those struggles are evident in various domains of the new economy.
B. The Role of Law Experts in the State and PrivateSectors
Although it is now generally accepted that the state sector is not
the sole source of law, law experts within that sector still make an
important contribution to the production of law. They are responsible
for providing advice to government, shaping policies, drafting legislation,
and designing and implementing regimes of enforcement. As advocates
and administrators, they constantly interpret state law, translate law into
practice and practice into law, and seek to validate particular meanings
of state law in the courts or within the executive arm of government. In
effect, the law experts of the state are the agents who translate general
political debates about social values into conceptual vocabularies, which
in turn are used to construct normative systems within public
bureaucracies. 101
But not only do law experts construct: they deconstruct. They sit
on courts and regulatory agencies, provide advisory opinions, and write
learned commentaries and criticisms, and, through processes of
interpretation and subordinate legislation, give crucial specificity to
vague enactments. And sometimes law experts obstruct: they advise or
warn of the possible negative legal, financial, or political consequences
of action, and thereby deter their clients-governmental or nongovernmental-from enacting, applying, or violating legal norms. In this
way, they not only produce law, but sometimes effectively inhibit or even
veto its production.

99

See Trubek et aL, supranote 96 at 410.

100 Ibid at 417-18. See also Y. Dezalay, "From Mediation to Pure Law: Practice and
Scholarly Representation Within the Legal Sphere" (1986) 14 Int'l J. Soc. L. 89 [hereinafter
"Mediation to Pure Law"].

101 H.W. Arthurs, "Law as an Instrument of State Intervention: A Framework for Enquiry" in
I. Bernier & A- Lajoie, eds., Law, Society and the Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1986) 77.
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Nor is the work of construction, deconstruction, and obstruction
confined to law experts in the public sphere. In contractual and other
private normative regimes, law experts help to shape transactions,
corporate structures, and commercial strategies. Here they play a role
similar to that which they play in the state sector: identifying issues,
proposing solutions, and translating those solutions into formal legal
arrangements-in effect, private legislation-and exercising a de facto
veto over arrangements which seem imprudent or irregular. Conversely,
they sometimes validate arrangements by pronouncing them prudent or
regular, as an accommodation for clients who wish to deflect subsequent
complaints or allegations by saying that they acted on the advice of their
lawyer or accountant. As in the state legal sector, they tend to dominate
the process of dispute resolution, by acting as negotiators, advocates,
and negotiators on a "repeat" basis, as distinct fr6m the occasional
appearances of non-experts.
Moreover, in case the point is not obvious, in neither the public
nor the private sphere do law experts always define their task as bringing
their clients into strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the law,
much less as reinforcing the rule of law. What they are trying to do is to
show their clients how to do what they wish to do without getting into
serious legal or practical difficulties with the state or with other private
actors.1 02
However, changes in the production of law, catalogued in Part
III, above, are reshaping and refocusing the role of law experts. As the
boundaries between state and civil society shift, as the state's regulatory
role is diminished, as law is being privatized, and as legal institutions are
increasingly hybridized, many of the functions previously performed by
them in the state sector are being abandoned. As legal conflicts
proliferate amongst state policies and agencies-some reflecting
frictions between the policies of the new economy and those of the
old-and as social and economic relations more generally are becoming
juridified, other functions acquire new importance. Since the legal field
is the site of frequent interactions between key political and economic
actors, law experts in government are being called upon as go-betweens,
mediating between private interests and public legislators, regulators
and regulatees, and the various and divergent domestic and international
agencies of the state. The results of this mediation of state and private
102 MeBarnet, supra note 64; J.McCahery & S.Picciotto, "Creative Lawyering and the
Dynamics of Business Regulation" in Dezalay & Sugarman, eds., supra note 79 at 238; and B.
Garth, "Transnational Legal Practice and Professional Ideology" (1985) 8 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal

Stud. 3 at 16-17.
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interests have to be captured in legal formulae and institutional
structures which are often adaptations of existing arrangements to novel
circumstances, sometimes wholly original, but increasingly hybridized or
privatized structures.
In the current dispensation, government law experts are
therefore likely to become more and more involved in managing the
regulatory retreat and financial realignment of the state articulating, for
example, new "principles" to induce adherence to national standards for
social programs in lieu of the previous "standards," which a retrenching
federal government can no longer enforce. Similarly, to the extent that
government itself, as an institution, is experiencing juridification of its
relations with its own employees, with clients and claimants, and with
citizens generally, its law experts are likely to become more and more
preoccupied with ensuring that these particular relations are conducted
in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of the
rule of law. The juridification of welfare, refugee admissions, and prison
administration, for example, have all resulted in an expansion of the
cadre of law experts employed by the state or by advocacy groups
attempting to influence the state's production of law in the form of
announced policies and practical outcomes. Or, to take a third example,
the urgent claims for greater autonomy and better social and economic
conditions for Canada's First Nations have led to a proliferation of law
experts who are striving to reconfigure the role of the federal
government in this area, and to construct alternative regimes of
Aboriginal self-government.
In all of these quite conventional respects, government law
experts are instrumental in the production and administration of law in
the state sector. As already noted, they occupy the state sector of the
legal field along with other groups of experts with whom they may
collaborate, contend, or compete. The important point, however, is that
the relationships amongst all of these expert groups, the outcomes they
achieve, even the arguments they use and their technical solutions to
problems are shaped not only by their shared expertise in law, but by
their divergent mandates, ideologies, and professional interests. As the
examples suggest, those mandates, ideologies, and interests, in turn, are
very much implicated in the changing role of the state in the new
economy.
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C. Law Experts in the TransnationalLegal Field
Globalization relocates important corporate actors and activities
beyond the reach of state law. In that sense, it might be thought,
globalization potentially diminishes the influence of law experts-or at
least of those whose expertise happens to be grounded in state law.
However, transnational actors and activities may not benefit from the
complete absence of whatever predictability and coherence state law
formerly provided, nor are they loath to invoke state law-or even
reproduce it-when it suits their purposes to do so. Whatever else is
implied by this paradox, it does point to the proliferation of non-state
regulatory regimes whose architects and artisans, we argue, are law

experts, often from the private sector.
Non-state regulatory regimes take many forms. Some are buried
in the interstices of business transactions and the fine print of financial
instruments-a phenomenon of domestic as well as global business
relations. Others emerge from what is assumed to be common practice
in transnational transactions, in the form of a new lex mercatoria,
articulated by arbitrators and acquiesced in by the business
community 03s Still others come about through the promulgation by
multinational corporations-acting alone or under the umbrella of
sectoral agreements-of codes of behaviour in sensitive areas such as
corrupt practices, worker rights, and pollution,104 or technical standards
for products and processes!O5 Law experts are central to the production
of these non-state regimes.
Moreover, the new economy is dominated by three regional
trading blocs-Europe, NAFTA, and the Asia-Pacific bloc-whose legal
103

Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2 at 42-43; J. Flood & A. Caiger, "Lawyers and Arbitration:
The Juridification of Construction Disputes" (1993) 56 Modern L Rev. 412; and T. Wilhelmsson,
"Legal Integration as Disintegration of National Law" in H. Petersen & H. Zahle, eds., Legal
Polycentricity:Consequences of Pluralismin Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) 127.
104
L. Compa & T. Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, "Enforcing Labour Rights through Corporate
Codes of Conduct" (1993) 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 663, also refer to codes governing investment,
enviromental, social, and ethical practices. For other examples, see D. Pink, "The Valdez
Principles: Is What's Good for America Good for General Motors?" (1990) 8 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
180; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994: Transnational Corporations,Employment and the
Workplace (New York: United Nations, 1994) at 313-40. See also the activities of Transparency
International (The Coalition against Corruption in International Business Transactions), which has
adopted Standards of Conduct in order to influence business behaviour through investigation and
publicity of corrupt practices: Pamphlet, "Introducing nt" [in possession of authors].
105 L. Salter, "Have We Reached the Information Age Yet?" (1993) 23 Int'l. J. Pol. Econ. 3;
and L. Salter, "The Housework of Capitalism: Standardization in the Communications and
Information Technology Sectors" (1993) 23 Int'l J. Pol. Econ. 105.
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institutions were formally created by international treaties and
implemented by state laws. Clearly, state law experts helped to
formulate the fundamental legal texts, such as that of NAFrA, but they did
not act alone. They were assisted by experts seconded from private
sector employment to serve on government negotiating and drafting
teams. More importantly, private-sector law experts were also active and
influential in their own right, as representatives of important sectoral
interests, and as advisors and interlocutors to the main negotiators. As a
trade bloc such as the Eu or NAFrA develops, moreover, it may-as any
complex institution might-develop its own cadre of experts, who will
perform routine tasks of administration, resolve disputes over the
meaning and application of basic texts, and support the periodic
renegotiation of their terms. Indeed, those recruited to serve in the
institutions of the bloc itself are regarded as highly-if not
excessively-influential, as witnessed by the resentment and black
humour which attend the manic regulatory initiatives of the Brussels
"Euro-crats."
Private sector experts also help to define the trade bloc as a legal
field in various ways. As indicated, they were influential in the original
conception of NAFrA. Since then, they have developed a significant "law
industry" providing advice to public and private sector clients on the
treaty and the two side agreements, offering training and information
programs on NAFrA for specialized audiences, promoting intra-bloc
contacts amongst various groups of professionals-including law
experts-and providing academic and journalistic writing on the legal
regime of NAFrA. Euro-law experts in the private sector exercise an even
more formidable influence on the direction, content, and effectiveness of
the regime-in part because the Eu has a more explicit and ambitious
regulatory bite. They are consulted extensively on the formation of
policies, the drafting of regulations, and the resolution of conflicts; when
subsidiary national legislation is to be enacted or interpreted, they make
representations, and they help to habituate their clients to the
requirements of European law and to reshape their clients' conduct to
conform (or appear to conform) with the regulatory regime.
Finally, the new economy involves increasingly complex
corporate arrangements designed to minimize domestic regulation and
taxation, to facilitate penetration of trade blocs or national spaces by
multinational corporations, or to forge alliances, networks, and other
corporate liaisons. Thus, the creation of holding companies and
subsidiaries, the negotiation of product mandates and procurement
policies, the sharing of trade secrets and technologies, and the host of
other linkages that bind the disparate elements of a global corporation
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and its satellites all must be devised, negotiated, reviewed, and
implemented. This is productive work for law experts.
D. Law Experts and Technology
Since the new economy is built around new forms of technology
and new flows of information, there is a particular need for these to be
protected and reinforced by new property rights and new contractual
arrangements. Moreover, in light of the trend towards globalization of
production, financial markets, and corporate structures, there is a
particular requirement that these new rights should operate regardless
of national borders. This has led to the adoption of several
complementary strategies.
International conventions and regional agreements require the
standardization or harmonization of national legislation governing many
of these matters. While harmonization is arguably a necessary
precondition to the international dissemination of technology, in fact it
tends to reinforce the dominance of the legal regimes of leading
countries, such as the United States, whose state law becomes a
benchmark or standard for other countries. 106 Moreover, the market
dominance of global corporations-again, many of them
American-which hold forms of property protected under the new
harmonized regime is also enhanced.1 07 On the other hand, however,
negotiation of international or regional conventions is a slow process:
their translation into "harmonized" national legislation is subject to the
usual political vicissitudes; and even when fully operational, state
regulatory regimes are not always equal to the task of protecting rapidly
changing technological innovation.
Consequently, instead of relying on supra-state conventions or
state law, proprietors of technical innovations and industrial know-how
may try to protect them through the construction of private contractual
legal regimes. These private regimes may turn out to somewhat
resemble state law-indeed to resemble American law-even though it
is not invoked directly. In effect, state law is used by law experts as an
106 To be fair, this phenomenon is restricted neither to American law nor to international
conventions which reinforce the new economy.
107
An example: the Canadian generic drug industry grew up under the now-abandoned
provisions of the PatentAct,R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, permitting them to secure compulsory licences from
international drug firms, at regulated prices. As a result, they were able to produce and market
these drugs in Canada, to supply them at a favourable price to Canadian consumers, and to
moderate the burden of drug costs for Canada's health care system.
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intellectual template with which to reconfigure private arrangements.
Over time, as these legal regimes come to incorporate, codify, and
project what can plausibly be described as "normal" business practice,
pressures mount for national laws to be brought into conformity with
what international business expects.
This can sometimes be
accomplished by modifications in the administration of existing national
laws, sometimes by their amendment, and sometimes by their
supersession by international conventions or treaties. Sometimes, too,
private legal regimes, like state regimes, may appear to be too
cumbersome or risky. Owners of new forms of industrial property may
decide instead to rely on secrecy, to disseminate their industrial
processes, software, and confidential information nationally and
transnationally only through internal company channels, within which it
can hopefully be protected against industrial espionage.1 08 Thus, law
experts play a role at every turn: in the initial formulation of
international standards, in the rewriting of national law, in its application
to specific issues, and in the formation and execution of alternative
strategies.
E. CompetitionAmongst Law Experts in the New Economy
It could hardly be argued that the role of law experts within the
sectors of the legal field most affected by the new economy represents a
radical departure. Obviously not; law experts have performed analogous
roles producing law in previous times and under different circumstances.
However, their role in the new economy does-take on certain distinctive
qualities which require some discussion.
First, the production of law at a distance from the state, even
from supra-state institutions, gives law experts in the private sector an
unusual degree of influence. Whereas law experts representing clients in
encounters with state law were constrained, even chastened, by the
possible consequences of their clients acting illegally--or being caught in
illegality themselves-fewer constraints operate in the new economy
where so much happens outside the reach of the state, and where the
state itself is acting with diminishing vigour and vigilance. Consequently,
the law expert is put in the paradoxical position of being able to
maximize the client's freedom of action, while also having to accept
108 The detection and prevention of industrial espionage have become, in the United States,
part of the mandate of both public agencies (including the Central Intelligence Agency) and private
firms, such as the "Big Six" consulting firms, some of which now offer security management services.
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greater personal responsibility as the inspiration and instrument of any
new system of self-regulation.
Second, the privatization of law production makes possible the
proliferation of legal forms and fora and places a premium on legal
creativity. Here too there is a paradox. It is not enough to invent, say,
new legal rules for international licensing or loan agreements: these
rules must be satisfactory to customers, bankers, suppliers, and creditors.
The result is that privatized arrangements often reflect those familiar to
the law expert, either because they are common in a particular trade
sector, or because they resemble state law, typically the state law of the
United States or other dominant economies. Creativity is thus
constrained by the need for intelligibility and acceptability.
Third, accepting that state law is often disproportionately
influenced by powerful business interests, the legislative process in most
democratic countries nonetheless provides an opportunity for public
input, debate, and the accommodation of competing viewpoints. Not so
the law produced by law experts. Much of the law of the new economy
suffers from a democratic deficit both in terms of process and in terms of
content1 09
And finally, to return to an issue raised above, at the outset of
this section, law experts contend with each other for control of the
international legal field. Public- and private-sector law experts have
different clients and different mandates, and consequently will often
have different ideological perspectives. However, whereas the state
might once have been thought to hold the trump hand, the new economy
relegates the state to a junior partnership with business. The state is no
longer meant to regulate, except to the extent that regulation produces
national peace and productivity and facilitates global trade, while the
global corporation is no longer meant to be the target of regulation so
much as a prime contributor to national and global prosperity. In this
context, the struggle for control between state and private-sector law
experts is likely to be muted,110 and likely to take the form of
109 See generally de Sousa Santos, supra note 5; and Garth, supra note 73. The EU'S
"democratic deficit" is a persistent theme in discourse surrounding European integration. The
extent to which the Treaty on European Union (popularly known as the Maastdcht Treaty), signed on
7 February 1992 and entering into force on 1 November 1993, may restore legitimacy to EU
institutions is addressed in S. Laitinen-Rawana, "Creating a Unified Europe: Maastricht and
Beyond" (1994) 28 Int'l Law. 973.
110 The point is illustrated in various ways: close consultation between state and private sector
experts in the shaping of government policy; the hiring of private sector experts to represent state
interests in policy-sensitive issues, such as trade disputes, and the secondment of private sector
experts to government service for limited periods of time. Each of these strategies-whatever its
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compromise, if not mutual cooptation-another manifestation of the
democratic deficit that is a defining characteristic of the new economy.
Within the private sector, competition amongst law experts is
clearly discernible. Local lawyers compete with national law firms.11
National law firms compete with international law firms which compete
with accounting and consulting firms. 12 Contestation between rival
groups of international arbitrators, and arbitration counsel, with
divergent styles and claims to authority, have been well documented! 13
Accountants, life insurance and trust companies, and investment
counsellors all compete with lawyers in the market for the provision of
tax planning for wealthy clients. Immigration consultants, tax preparers,
workers' compensation advocates, and auto insurance claims experts
compete with lawyers and accountants for a mass clientele.
While by no means all of these providers and consumers of law
expertise are directly implicated in the new economy, its pervasive
effects ensure that the production of law, and the competition amongst
legal producers, is directly affected by developments within it. For
example, changes in the relationship between the state and civil society
are eviscerating the publicly funded legal aid systems which we have built
up over the past thirty years. One result will be the intensification of
competition among law experts who provide advice in matrimonial and
immigration matters. Globalization which has stimulated changes in the
corporate structure of Canadian business, with more and more decision
making being centralized in the home office of global enterprises based
in the United States, may well lead to the proliferation of American law
firms in Canada. Changes in information technology which support legal
research and record-keeping will affect different kinds of law experts in
different ways. For example, routine services, such as divorces and
house purchases may be deskilled, 114 while law experts who provide
sophisticated services, such as tax advice, may become capital-intensive
as rulings and regulations effectively become accessible only with the aid
of a computer.
With this brief mention of examples of the possible effects of the
new economy on competition in the market for legal expertise, we turn

advantages-has the effect of eroding the differences between state and private sector experts.
111

Black v. Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
112 Dezalay & Sugarman, eds., supra note 79.
113 Dezaay & Garth, supra note 2.
114 j. Van Hoy, "Selling and Processing Law: Legal Work at Franchise Law Firms" (1995) 29
Law & Soc'y Rev. 703.
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to a closer analysis of the legal profession, one of the primary sources of
that expertise.V. THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE NEW ECONOMY
The new economy has transformed the legal profession or, at the
least, aggravated tendencies within the profession which have been
emerging for some time. We take note of four such tendencies, each of
which is related to the other. First, the profession has become more and
more functionally diverse, and at the same time, and for that very
reason, more stratified. Stratification of the profession reflects, and is
causally related to, social stratification, which the new economy has
intensified. It has helped to create a multidimensional crisis of
professional governance. Second, as a consequence of social and
professional stratification, middling and marginalized clienteles within
the community are being less, and less well, served by the legal system.
Third, law firms in the upper stratum of the profession are most closely
identified with the dominant forces of the new economy in a functional
sense. As is the case with corporations in many sectors of the new
economy, the development of these law firms in the past twenty or thirty
years has been characterized by two phenomena-a concentration of
wealth and power, and a geographic dispersal of activity from the local
to the national to the global level. Fourth, as a result especially of this
concentration, law firms within the upper strata-sometimes referred to
as Cravathist firms-have experienced and reacted to internal stresses
similar to those that have transformed their industrial counterpart, the
Fordist manufacturing enterprise.
A. Diversificationand Stratification
The legal profession in the United States and Canada, had been
quite stratified well before the advent of the new economy.115 Scholars
115 In the American context, see J.E. Carlin, Lawyers on their Own: A Study of Individual
Practitioners in Chicago (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962); J.P. Heinz & E.O.
Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1982); and R.L. Abel, American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For Canada,
see generally H.W. Arthurs, R. Weisman & F.H. Zemans, "The Canadian Legal Profession" (1986)

Am. B. Found. Res. J. 447; D. Stager with H.W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1990); J. Hagan, M. Huxter & P. Parker, "Class Structure and Legal Practice:
Inequality and Mobility among Toronto Lawyers" (1988) 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 9; F.M. Kay, Women
in the Legal Profession:A Report submitted to the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: Lsuc,
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have long pointed to the existence of "two hemispheres" within the legal
profession: 116 a functional division within the profession based on
specialities of legal practice and the type of client served; and a
hierarchical division, based on the prestige and rewards attached to
these differing practice situations, which were populated differentially by
lawyers with particular personal and sociological characteristics. One
hemisphere comprises "high status lawyers educated in elite law schools,
who represent corporations and work in high-prestige areas of law," the
lawyers from the lower classes and ethnic and
other "predominantly ...

religious minorities, educated in local and night law schools,117who
represent individual clients and work in low-prestige areas of law."1
While the new economy did not initiate stratification, it certainly
exacerbated it. The proliferation of legal forms and fora, privatization,
the transnationalized production of legal norms, and greater
competition between and within state and non-state producers of law,
echo and replicate developments in other sectors of the new economy
which have experienced analogous processes of deregulation,
privatization, globalization, and heightened competition within and
amongst private and public service providers. The cumulative effect of
these developments in law and in the economy more generally has been
a tremendous expansion of demand for high value-added services
(particularly legal services). This demand, in the United States 118 as
elsewhere, has disproportionately benefited lawyers serving large
corporate clients who are implicated in the new economy. As Nelson
and Trubek point out:
The corporate sector is attracting a growing share of the total expenditures on legal
services. This has resulted in a dramatic expansion in the size of law firms and the overall
earnings of large-firm lawyers. The personal client hemisphere, in contrast, has been
flooded with cohorts of young law graduates, and average earnings have declined
substantially.11 9

1989); and J. Hagan & F. Kay, Gender in Practice:A Study of Lawyers' Lives (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
1 16
Heinz & Laumann, supranote 115.
1 17

R.L Nelson & D.M. Trubek, "New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal
Profession" in R.L. Nelson, D.M. Trubek & R.L. Solomon, eds., Lawyers'Ideals/Lawyers'Practices:
Transformationsin the American LegalProfession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 1 at 8.
118 Over the period 1970 to 1987, the legal services industry in the United States doubled its
share of national income. See ibkd at 8.
119 IbiL at 9. The authors go on to note that in the United States, the average solo
practitioner's income was 43 per cent as much as a law firm partner in 1961; that share fell on
average to only 28 per cent as much by 1985.
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By contrast, elements of the profession at the periphery of the new
economy are in decline or at risk. The position of solo practitioners and
small firms, particularly in the metropolitan areas, seems to be the most
vulnerable. These firms typically serve working-class and middle-class
clients, and small businesses. Over the past twenty or thirty years, there
had been an expansion of the need for legal services for members of
these groups in tax and regulatory matters affecting small businesses, in
real estate and family law, and in criminal law. For some time, in
Canada at least, positive economic conditions enabled many of those
who required legal services to pay for them. Those who could not afford
to pay were supported by the rapidly expanding legal aid system and a
modest growth in legal clinics and group-sponsored legal service plans.
However, this clientele has experienced economic difficulties in recent
years-measured, for example, by declining blue-collar wages, falling
house prices, and increasing personal and business bankruptcies; they
have less discretionary income, and are less able to afford legal services.
But although the need is increasing, legal aid expenditures are being
dramatically reduced, clinics and group plans are in danger, and lawyers
willing and able to provide needed services are less likely to be publicly
subsidized to do so.
Lawyers in the lower strata of the profession thus confront a
declining market. Furthermore, they also confront rising overheads due
to rapidly escalating professional licence fees and insurance costs, capital
investment in information technology, and, likely, mandatory continuing
education and other costs of maintaining their own professional
competence. Finally, their core business of performing standard services
for individual clients at modest fees is highly vulnerable to competition'
from a new species of multi-location, franchised legal service providers,
relying heavily on secretaries, computers, and mass-production
techniques.120 Thus, serious hardship lies ahead for many lawyers in the
lower strata-the "working class"-of the profession. However, they
seldom escape into the other "hemisphere" of the profession: the same
personal and sociological characteristics which consigned them to their
initial professional roles ensure that they will remain there.
The middle ranks of the legal profession have been populated by
firms which serve a more affluent individual and corporate clientele,
although seldom the largest institutional clients. Recruitment into these
firms is varied, but many of, them developed around a core group of able
lawyers who by choice or by reason of their background did not find
their way into the elite firms. Until fairly recently, these firms have
12 0

Van Hoy, supranote 114.
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prospered. However, they now confront a declining market, in part due
to the new economy which features transnational corporations, high
technology, consolidation of core enterprises, and the marginalization of
small companies and individual service providers. Essentially, mid-sized
law firms are losing clients to the elite firms which have a national and
international presence, a complete range of specialized services, and
access to an extensive network of valuable contacts. To compete, midsized firms must therefore become larger, either by expanding and
diversifying or by merging with other firms. If they cannot make this
transition, they will likely either be required to reinvent themselves as
"boutique" firms within special niche areas of practice or to suffer
decline, dissolution, bankruptcy, or piecemeal absorption by their
12 1
competitors,
This account of stratification does not speak to the miscellany of
practitioners who work in other practice settings: in small and mid-sized
communities, in the law departments of corporations, governments, and
other institutions, or in private or public clinics. While their patterns of
recruitment, reward, and practise differ considerably, these practitioners
have one thing in common: unlike lawyers in the prestige firms, they are
heavily or totally dependent upon a single "client" or community of
clients, and have little or no opportunity either to diversify or retool.
They therefore flourish or suffer as the fortunes of their clients wax and
wane. As both governments and locally based industries are doing more
waning than waxing in the new economy, most of these lawyers will do
likewise.
The picture, then, is one of increasing stratification within the
profession. The largest firms are growing in size, power, and (relatively,
at least) affluence; solo practitioners and small firms are facing a radical
decline in their prospects; and middle-sized firms are being absorbed,
dissolved, or, perforce, reinvented. And to reiterate: the various strata
of the profession are not randomly populated with men and women,
members of various religious and ethno-cultural groups, or graduates of
particular law schools. Even recent data show that recruitment in the
elite firms, while more and more meritocratic, still favours males from
preferred socio-economic backgrounds and law schools. 122

121 J. Fitzpatrick, "Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the
Century" (1989) 64 Ind. L.. 461 at 464.
122
Hagan, Huxter & Parker, supra note 115; Hagan & Kay, supranote 115; and M. Cain, "The
Symbol Traders" in Cain & Harrington, eds., supranote 64, 15 at 26-27.
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B. The Professionaland Societal Consequences of Stratification
Thus, lawyers engaged in heterogeneous conditions of work
exhibit different class, ethnic, and gender characteristics, and occupy
different positions within both the profession and the national political
economy. Not surprisingly, their visions of themselves, of their work,
and of their profession vary considerably. As Nelson and Trubek
suggest:
[L]awyer professionalism is not a fixed, unitary set of values, but instead consists of
multiple visions of what constitutes proper behaviour by lawyers. Conceptions of lawyer
professionalism reflect 'the arenas' in which they are produced, that is, the particular
institutional settings in which groups construct, explicitly or implicitly, models of the law
and of lawyering.123

These divergent conceptions of professionalism generate conflicts over
such issues as specialization, competence, legal aid, fee levels,
competitive practices, and control of entry to the profession. Such
conflicts can no longer be resolved through the assertion of hierarchical
authority by the profession's traditional elites; their authority has been
eroded both by increasing stratification and by the increasing
democratization of professional governing structures. Rather, conflicts
take the form of hotly contested elections for governing bodies,
widespread resistance to professional policy initiatives and fee levies,
and even litigation challenging the authority of governing bodies.
Indeed, the profession is experiencing growing internal political
dissension at the'very moment when it also confronts the profound and
permanent external challenges of the new economy. Given such
dissension, it is difficult to imagine how long the bar can survive as a
unified profession, with a single licensing structure, a single ethical code,
and a single, omnicompetent governing body.
Stratification of the legal profession has also influenced legal
education and what might be called legal science 24 Since careers in
large law firms are known to be the most highly paid, and perceived to
be the most professionally challenging, law school curricula have to some
extent focused on preparing students for such careers. Likewise, legal
scholars have devoted considerable attention to the problems
encountered by those who practise in such firms. The result has been,
123

R.- Nelson & D.M. Trubek, "Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of
Lawyers in Context" in Nelson, Trubek & Solomon, eds., supra note 117, 177 at 179 [hereinafter
"Arenas of Professionalism"].
124 "Mediation to Pure Law," supra note 100 at 89.
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some claim, 12S a considerable ideological skew in legal education and
research.
The dominance of the prestige firms and their characteristic
version of law has not been absolute. The firms themselves, in what has
been portrayed as a strategy of legitimation, perform a significant
amount of pro bono or public service work.126 More importantly, law
schools have often functioned as what one scholar has called "counterhegemonic enclaves," 127 and launched important counter-trends in legal
education and scholarship. 128 And publicly funded legal clinics and
advocacy groups have created competing models of service delivery and
competing visions of law and its social mission.129
However, the new economy places all these counter-tendencies
at risk. Cuts in public expenditure have diminished the law schools'
margin for innovation in teaching and research. Insecurity about future
job prospects has dampened student enthusiasm for critical perspectives.
Cutbacks in public funding for legal clinics and advocacy groups have
reduced their share of the production of law and legal services.13 0
Concerns about the "bottom line" have led even affluent law firms to
reduce their involvement inpro bono work. It would not be too much to
say that the new economy has indeed operated as a disciplining
framework for the law industry.
At the same time, the growing stratification of the profession
does not affect the profession alone. It affects society as a whole. In
12 5

C.B. Harrington, "Outlining a Theory of Legal Practice" in Cain & Harrington, eds., supra

note 61, 49. See, more generally, A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, "Law, Politics and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199.

126 Much of this began in the late 1960s as large firms responded to "criticism that their work
was unfulfilling and inimical to the public interest." See M. Galanter & T. Palay, "The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm" in Nelson, Trubek & Solomon, eds., supra note 117,31 at 52.
12 7
D. Kennedy, "Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy" (1982) 32 J. Legal
Educ. 591 at 614-15.
128 D. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy:A Polemic Against the
System (Cambridge, Mass.: Afar, 1983); Sugarman, ed., supra note 61; A. Chase, "The Birth of the
Modem Law School" (1979) 23 Am. J. Legal Hist. 329; P. Gabel & P. Harris, "Building Power and
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law" (1982-83) N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc.
Change 369; D. Kairys, ed., The Politics ofLaw:A ProgressiveCritique (New York: Pantheon, 1982);

K. Klare, "The Law School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?" (1982) 32 J. Legal Educ. 336;
and E. Dvorkin, J. Himmelstein & H. Lesnick, Becoming a Lawyer A Humanistic Perspective on
LegalEducationandProfessionalism(St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1981).
129 For a recent account of legal aid in Canada, see National Council of Welfare, LegalAid
andthe Poor(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1995).
130
F.H. Zemans & L.T. Smith, "Can Ontario Sustain Cadillac Legal Services?" (1994) 5 Md.
. Contemp. Legal Issues 271.
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effect, large commercial enterprises are acquiring even more
comprehensive access to skilled, specialized, and well-connected legal
advisors, at the same time as governments, community institutions, midsized businesses, and ordinary citizens are all experiencing a
downgrading and an increasing scarcity of legal services. To the extent
that the economics and technology of contemporary legal practice favour
firms with large staffs, libraries, and computers, important advantages
accrue to the clients of these favoured firms. To the extent that
litigation is becoming more and more expensive, access to litigation is
more and more restricted, and more and more dominated by those who
act for wealthy clients; non-affluent clients and their lawyers are under
pressure to settle rather than sue. To the extent that large multinational
corporations have access to international commercial arbitration, or to
conventional litigation in the forum of their choice, public accountability
for this high-stakes litigation is diminished. And to the extent that other
regimes of public regulation are being relaxed or repealed, and replaced
by non-state or supra-state systems, lawyers who dominate these new
fora are becoming more and more influential in shaping legal norms; as
their influence rises, it predictably tilts outcomes in the direction of their
clients.
All of these developments suggest that, as a result of increased
professional stratification in the new economy, we are likely to see
further deterioration in the legal power of most people and businesses,
as they confront powerful corporations and their legal experts.
Ironically, this development coincides with the end of a period of
experimentation with publicly funded litigation as a means of redressing
unequal economic power. In the new economy, there will be less
funding to support citizens engaged in consumer and environmental
litigation, or defending state regulation against corporate challenges
based on the Charteror NAFTA or the GATr. Quite apart from political
attacks on regulation per se, this will exacerbate the inequalities
attributable to professional stratification.
C. Internationalizationand Concentrationof Legal Practice
Over the past ten or fifteen years, there has been a considerable
concentration of legal practice in the largest law firms of the United
States and the United Kingdom, of Canada and of some European
countries, especially in areas of law most pertinent to the new economy.
Large law firms across North America and Europe have increased in size
(employing greater numbers of lawyers and support staff), geographical
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dispersal (with branch offices or affiliates across the country and
abroad), control of legal production (as outlined above), and influence
in society generally (through their connections with corporate, financial,
3

and government elites).1 1
During this same period, the effects of globalization have been
felt by law firms, despite their long tradition of sheltering from foreign
competition behind protective barriers such as professional monopolies,
practice requirements based on knowledge of local law, and the close
affinity between state sovereignty, legislation, and adjudication. These
barriers have become much more permeable in the new economy, in
light of the privatization of much law making and dispute resolution, of
regional economic integration and the creation of regional and supranational juridical institutions, and of the determination of law firms to
reach beyond their traditional local markets in order to retain or
recapture the international business of their transnational corporate
clients.
American law firms have led this process of concentration and
internationalization across North America and into Europe. The largest
firm on Wall Street, New York in the early 1960s was Shearman &
Sterling & Wright with 125 lawyers (thirty-five partners, ninety
associates). Only three other Wall Street firms had over 100 lawyers1 3 2
Moreover, the largest firms generally were located in and identified with
a single city.13 3 In contrast, by 1988 there were 115 law firms in the
United States each employing more than 200 lawyers i3 4 The largest
American law firm at present, Baker & McKenzie, is a full service,
multinational conglomerate with branch offices across the United States,
Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia. It employs 1,300 lawyers. Most
large American firms have rapidly internationalized: forty-four of the
largest 100 law firms in the United States had a total of 136 overseas
offices by 1988.135
Leading Canadian law firms have generally followed suit,
although their growth and internationalization has been much more

131 In Canada, related legal institutions include the Canadian Bar Association and provincial
law societies.
132

M. Galanter & T. Palay, Tournament ofLawyers: The Transformationof the Big Law Firm

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 22 [hereinafter Tournamentof Lawyers].
13 3 lbid at 23.
134 Ibid at 46. The fifty largest firms doubled in size from 1975-1985, from an average of 124
to an average of 252: Galanter & Palay, supra note 126 at 45-46.
135

Galanter & Palay, supra note 126 at 47.
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recent, rapid, and selective than that of their American counterparts.1 36
In 1962, none of the forty-eight largest firms had more than 100 lawyers.
By 1980, only one Canadian firm had more than 100 lawyers. By 1990,
nineteen law firms in Canada had more than 100 lawyers,137-the very
largest, such as McCarthy T6trault, employing 200 or more lawyers. 138
Canadian law firms have also expanded their geographic scope, moving
from local to national status on an unprecedented scale, by means of
expansion, mergers, affiliations, and alliances 3 9 Fourteen Canadian
firms opened eighteen foreign offices between 1985 and 1990, more than
triple the number opened in the twenty years prior to 1985.140 Whether
these firms will survive the challenges of globalization and regional
economic integration, and their effects on the Canadian economy, must
1 41
be regarded as an open question.
Law firms in European countries have also internationalized
rapidly since the early 1980s42 This process was spurred by the
prospect of new markets for transnational legal services, due to the
penetration of Europe by American multinational corporations, the

136 C. Wilton, "Introduction" in C. Wilton, ed., CanadianLaw Firms in HistoricalPerspective
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 1996) 1 at 71, notes that "whereas
the Americans produced giant firms by the 1950s, their Canadian counterparts appeared only
shortly before the mega-firms of the 1980s."
137 R. Daniels, "Growing Pains: The Why and How of Law Firm Expansion" (1993) 43
U.T.L.J. 147 at 155-56.
138 F.M. Kay & J.Hagan, "Changing Opportunities for Partnership for Men and Women
Lawyers During the Transformation of the Modem Law Firm," (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L...
413 at
416. This concentration and centralization of Canadian legal production has been propelled by
federal derdgulation of the Canadian financial industry-which eroded barriers between banks,
trusts companies, investment houses, and insurance companies, the continentalizing of trade and
investment via the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and later, the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and continued corporate concentration in Canada through mergers and
acquisitions-notably in the late 1980s. For further elaboration, see Wilton, supra note 136 at 57-64.
139 There were thirty-seven regional and national mergers and affiliations across Canada
between 1981 and October 1990. See Daniels, supranote 137 at 187-88; and Wilton, supra note 136
at 65.
14 0
Daniels, supra note 137 at 157-159.
141 See H.W. Arthurs, "Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century" (1996) Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. [forthcoming].
142 Trubek et aL, supra note 96 at 435-448. Y. Dezalay, "The Big Bang and the Law: The
Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field" (1990) 7 Theory, Culture & Soc'y 279
at 281 [hereinafter "BigBang"], also argues that the largest European firms have been modelled on
the Wall Street firm.
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deregulation of European-especially British-financial markets,143 and
concerted efforts to harmonize regulatory standards and liberalize
national markets across Europej 44 The newly emerging European
transnational law firms, particularly in the United Kingdom and, to a
lesser extent, in the Netherlands and Germany,145 found themselves in
competition with American law firms (already a significant presence in
Europe by the late 1970s), the so-called "Big Six" accounting firms which
had transformed themselves into multinational, multidisciplinary
consulting conglomerates, and in-house counsel of European
corporations. Between 1985 and 1990, however, the total professional
complement of the twenty largest U.K. law firms doubled. The largest
U.K. firm, Clifford Chance, is now the second largest law firm in the
world (after Baker & McKenzie) with 1,100 lawyers. Many U.K. firms
have opened offices throughout Europe to match the ubiquitous
European presence of the large American firms and the Big Six.146
In certain respects, the new economy seems to have been a
catalyst for new or reconstituted legal regimes which have in turn
become important to lawyers as new sources of income and influence.
In this respect, American law firms have exerted a powerful influence, in
part because of their linkages with American-based corporations. They
recruit local lawyers and through graduate training and apprenticeship,
educate them in American-style practice and the conceptual structures
of American law. In association with a new generation of legal
academics, also trained in or influenced by American law, they have
helped to create transnational legal regimes. These transnational
regimes are the result not of state or supranational enactments, but of
private arrangements. Using these arrangements, international law

143 For more elaboration on the recent rise of mega-law firms in the U.K. and Thatcherite
deregulation-notably of London financial markets, see J. Flood "Megalaw in the U.K.:
Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report" (1989) 64 Ind. L.J. 569. This financial
deregulation demolished barriers between trading, stockbroking, and advising in the London
market. See "BigBang," supra note 142 at 290, note 4.
144

The leading role taken by U.K. law firms in establishing a presence in Brussels preparatory

to 1992 European unification has been empirically documented: see N. Tutt, "Bar sans fronti~res in
Brussels" (30 September 1988) 138 New L.J. 707. One should be cautious not to assume that these

measures have brought about a common European legal culture. Significant national legal-cultural
differences remain in Europe. See, for example, V. Gessner, "Global Legal Interaction and Legal
Cultures" (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 132.
145 Many European multinational law firms evolved from aggressive mergers and acquisitions.
Trubek et aL, supra note 96 at 435, cite their growth as "[p]erhaps the most dramatic development

on the European scene."
146
1bid. at 435-36.
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firms have managed, for example, to accomplish mergers, acquisitions,
and reorganizations of global corporations in Europe, essentially in
147
accordance with American law.
There is a certain business logic to this. The shareholders, debtholders, assets, workers, suppliers, and customers of a corporation with
headquarters in the United States may be located almost anywhere in
the world. If the corporation's affairs are to be reorganized, or its debts
restructured in some consistent or coherent fashion, this must be done
according to a process which embraces all interested parties, regardless
of their location.
Whether reorganization or restructuring is
contemplated, even permitted, by local law is beside the point from the
point of view of whoever is the moving party in the process. Global
corporations do not regard themselves as being at the disposal of
idiosyncratic-and often inconsistent and inconvenient-national legal
regimes. Here is the justification for the creation of transnational legal
regimes, and an illustration of the power, influence, and technical skill of
international law firms. They know American law; they know local law;
they are able to work out how to achieve the essential requirements of
the former without overtly contravening the latter. But here too is the
source of potential injustice and justifiable concern. International law
firms obviously work for a particular clientele, typically banks and
businesses, not workers or unions. Their objective is to maximize the
financial interests of their clients, rather than, say, to protect jobs or the
solvency of local suppliers or customers. In any given instance, if they
are able to ensure that a privately constructed transnational regime
triumphs over local state law, their large corporate clients may benefit
and workers and small businesses may lose out.
Another example makes a similar point. Privatization and
globalization have created a "market" for normative regimes and dispute
resolution procedures which are not aligned with a particular national
legal system. A dramatic increase in international arbitration of major
disputes between transnational corporations has ensued. Because the
size and importance of such disputes makes arbitration practice
especially valuable, intense competition has ensued for control of the
arbitration market. Lawyers and their clients now engage in extensive
forum shopping amongst arbitral regimes, arbitrators, and venues, in
order to secure arrangements which appear optimal in terms of cost,
speed, privacy, selection of decisionmakers, and confidence in
predictable outcomes. The result is what one scholar refers to as "justice

147 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2 at 49-58.
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A la carte." 148 Seen from a public policy perspective, the predictable
outcome of this market competition between regimes is that business
gravitates towards those which "favour maximum recognition of freedom
of contract and freedom from national laws and regulations." 149
Transnational legal regimes, then, like other legal fields, must
thus be seen as sites of contestation amongst competing forms of
property, social and economic interests, ideologies, intellectual
perspectives, and modes of production. These contestations resemble,
are related to, and derived from those which occur elsewhere in the new
economy. Large law firms have come to play a key role in the
construction of these new regimes-both domestically and
internationally-and consequently in the resulting global and national
distribution of wealth and power. As the next section of this paper
suggests, however, they have not emerged unscathed from this dramatic
enhancement of their own affluence and influence.
D. "Cravathism"and the New Economy
The large, corporate American law firm-sometimes referred to
as "Cravathist" after the Wall Street firm of Cravath, Swaine, Moore, an
early and still leading exemplar 50-is such a powerful unit of legal
production that it is often referred to as a "law factory." Whether used
sardonically or admiringly, the metaphor invites extended consideration.
Like the Fordist industrial plant, the Cravathist law firm was
organized around specialization and the division of labour. Like the
Fordist industrial plant, it experienced a series of innovations and
successes and, latterly, problems: exponential growth in size 151 and

148 "Big Bang," supra note 142 at 288.
149 Garth, supranote 73 at 377.
150

The "Cravathist" model was pioneered by the Wall Street firm of Cravath, Swaine, Moore
in the 1960s. The prototypical large firm of that era operated within the boundaries of a large
metropolitan area (eg., New York, Chicago, Los Angeles). Firm loyalty was paramount; most
associates entered the firm with aspirations of partnership, and were routinely placed on
partnership tracks. Lateral hiring was the exception, most promotions came from within the firm on
the "up or out" model. The 1960s Cravathist firm is seen by most scholars to represent the "golden
age" of lawyering in the United States-an era where specialization, bureaucratization, and
rationalization of law firm practice had begun, but where these tendencies had not yet caused
concerns with respect to the loss of professional autonomy by a large-firm lawyer.
151 Such growth rates are prevalent both in the United States and Canada before and after
1970; Toronto law firms, in particular, grew more than 8 per cent annually over the decade 19801990. See Daniels, supra note 137 at 157.
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influence, 152 the evolution of strategies to deal with the recruitment,
training, and remuneration of personnel, 153 substitution of capital for
labour, a technological revolution, 5 4 volatile markets for professional
services, 155 escalating costs and declining profitability, and, belatedly,
innovations in firm structure and management technique.1 5 6
We do not wish to overtax the metaphor, particularly in relation
to the status of lawyers working in the "law factory." These Cravathist
"workers" experienced challenges, rewards, and a degree of dignity and
autonomy unknown to industrial workers; they had no need of or
interest in collective bargaining or other statutory regimes of workplace
regulation. They were, obviously, not workers at all, but entrepreneurs
with a share, or prospective share, in a highly sophisticated business.
Unlike the typical assembly-line worker or clerk, even the lowliest
associate lawyers aspired to "make partner" within a reasonable period
of time, to become a part-owner and manager of the firm following an
initial period as a well-paid probationer. However, while acknowledging
the limits of the metaphor, it is striking that Cravathism and Fordism are
being transformed by the new economy in rather similar ways.
In the industrial sector, under the intense pressure of global
competition, Fordism is being transformed by a range of innovations
15 7
collectively known as "flexible production," described above.
Cravathism is also being reshaped by competitive pressures driven by
changes in both the modes of production and the market for services,
thus, the restructuring of Cravathist firms tracks the evolving logic of
corporate organization in the new economy.15 8 Among its principal
features are: heightened attention to competitiveness as corporate

152 MJ. Green, The Other Government. The Unseen Power of Washington Lawyers (New York:

Grossman, 1975); L.M. Friedman, Total Justice (New York: Russell Sage, 1985); and R.A.
Ferguson, Law and Letters inAmerican Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

For a critique of the general perception that lawyers exercise considerable influence over national
policy-making in the American context, see R.L. Nelson & J.P. Heinz with E.O. Laumann & R.H.
Salisbury, "Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington" (1988) 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 237.
153

Tournament ofLawyers, supranote 132 at 55-58.

154

1bI

at 42; and Stager with Arthurs, supranote 115 at 181-82.

155 Fitzpatrick, supra note 121 at 464; and Daniels, supra note 137 at 169 underscore the
growing use of in-house counsel. Many large firms have responded to this volatility in the demand
for legal services by hiring their own marketing directors and engaging in aggressive marketing
campaigns. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 126 at 49.
156 One such innovation is greater diversification: see Fitzpatrick, supranote 121 at 466-67.
157 See Part II(C), above, for a discussion of this issue.

158 Daniels, supranote 137.
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clients try to hold down their costs by putting legal services out to tender,
attending to them in-house or, where possible, dispensing with them
altogether;15 9 geographic expansion by law firms beyond their traditional
local markets so as to serve transnational clients through branch offices
or affiliates located across the country and abroad;160 "product"
diversification in the form of a more comprehensive range of specialized
professional services, and consequent proliferation of semi-autonomous
departments, practice groups, or teams within the firm; and enhanced
attention to profitability as evidenced by greater emphasis on aggressive
marketing, productivity, and cost controls.161
These developments have caused, and are causing, significant
changes in the structure, management, and culture of Cravathist firms,
and especially in the security, status, and working conditions of the
lawyers who work in them.. Increased competitiveness, size,
specialization, and geographic dispersal require a restructuring and
rationalization of the Cravathist firm. Specifically, they generate
pressures to subordinate individual practice preferences, skills,
aspirations, and lifestyles to overall firm strategy. To devise and
implement firm strategy, however, changes are required in the decisionmaking processes of the partnership. These changes seem to presage
greater bureaucratization. Collegial self-management by the lawyerpartners seems in disfavour and some firms are experimenting with
professional management by non-lawyer "chief executives" and their
consultants. 162 More ambitious and detailed business plans, along with
163
more single-minded focus on billable hours and the "bottom line,"
159 It has been observed that legal shopping has become increasingly sophisticated. In
international commercial disputes it resembles "justice h la carte"-that is, extends to the forum for
conflict resolution. Transnational clients are increasingly bypassing formal public judicial processes

in favour of private alternatives (eg., arbitration, mini-trials, and rent-a-judge schemes). See "Big
Bang," supranote 142 at 288-89.

160 Many observers forecast that these tendencies towards concentration and centralization of
legal production within the mega-firm will continue. A senior partner in Clifford Chance (the
a few years' time, there will only be room for
United Kingdom's largest law firm) predicts that "[i]n
about a half a dozen big international law firms": cited in Flood, supra note 143 at 578.
161 A 1 per cent shift in the economy translates into a 2 per cent shift in demand for legal
services. See Stager with Arthurs, supra note 115 at 319.

162 Tournamentof Lawyers, supra note 132 at 52.
163 Ile average annual target for billable hours in most major firms in the United States and
Canada in 1990 was 1,600, up from 1,500 the previous year. Annual targets for billable hours have
generally increased over the past decade in large law firms, such that targets of 2,000 hours (or
more) in major Toronto firms are not uncommon. See K. Monteith, "1989 National Associate
Survey" CanadianLawyer (December 1989/January 1990) 22. See also Canadian Bar Association,

Touchstones for Change: Equaity,Diversiy andAccountability,Report of the Task Force on Gender
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blur the traditional professional ethos of the Cravathist firm.

Specifically, they dilute one of its traditional strengths, namely, the
ability to renew the firm by attracting, recruiting, socializing, training,
and promoting very able and energetic young lawyers. In the new
economy, however, while a privileged cadre of such recruits remains, and
pursues more-or-less traditional career paths, more and more firms are
introducing more heterogenous employment conditions, and entering
into more flexible and non-traditional arrangements with lawyers who
will always function at its periphery.1 64 Simply put, within the very elite
of the legal profession-the Cravathist firm-there are good jobs and
not-so-good jobs, and the latter are expanding faster than the former 65
In sum, the new mode of Cravathism is one of greater intra-firm
stratification and fragmentation at the core.
These tendencies are reflected in lower percentages of associates
being promoted to partner, 166 after longer probationary periods,16 7
slower and fewer promotions within the large firm and more lateral
hiring,168 and eroding security of tenure for partners. 169 The
Equality in the Legal Profession (Ottawa: CBA, 1993) at 84 [hereinafter Task Force Report]. In the
United States, billable hours targets have recently increased by almost 100 a year-with targets
reaching as high as 2,300 in a major Los Angeles firm: see C. Menkel-Meadow, "Feminization of
the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers" in R.L. Abel & P.S.C. Lewis,
eds.,Lawyers in Society, vol. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) 221.
164 Tempting as it might be, we are not suggesting these tendencies translate to an overall
proletarianization of the legal profession. The proletarianization thesis has been put by E.
Spangler, Lawyers for Hire: SalariedProfessionalsat Work (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1986). For a cogent critique of this thesis see, "Arenas of Professionalism," supra note 123 at
202-07.
1 65
Hagan, Huxter & Parker, supranote 115 at 9.
16 6

As Kay & Hagan, supra note 138 at 447, put it, "opportunities for promotion for women
and men have not kept pace with the growth of the profession." Ontario lawyers called to the bar in
1975 have a 34 per cent probability of invitation to partnerships. Those chances have declined
steadily on average for all Ontario lawyers called to the bar in 1982 (27 per cent) and in 1985 (20 per
cent). See Kay & Hagan at 448-49.
167 In the United States, some firms have increased the number of years before admission to
partnership from six or seven years to eight or nine years: see ibid. at 418.
168 Tournament ofLawyers, supra note 132 at 54, observe that lateral hiring has become much
more common since the 1970s and has now "widened out from individual lawyers to whole
departments and groups within firms and to whole firms." In 1988, over 100 large American law
firms hired more than half their associates and partners laterally, rather than from promotions
within the firm. The growth in lateral hiring and commercial orientation of the large law firm is
echoed in Fitzpatrick, supranote 121.
169 Mergers and acquisitions of firms have contributed to this tendency. Many merger
arrangements are conditional upon a rationalization (ie., downsizing) of the new firm's partners or
greater differentiation in partnership status (senior vs. junior vs. non-equity). A greater emphasis
on "rainmaking"-the bringing in of new business-and profitability has also led many firms simply
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restructuring of the Cravathist firm in both the United States and
Canada has led to increasing ratios of associates to partners, 170 and
consequently to "a higher proportion of new lawyers who are starting
their careers as employees and retaining that status for longer
periods." 171 Salaried lawyers-in Cravathist firms and elsewhere-have
been described as a "professional proletariat"172 amounting in 1985 to
more than one-third of Toronto lawyers! 73 In the prestigious field of
corporate commercial law-essentially the field dominated by the
Cravathist firms-about a fifth of salaried lawyers remained as
"untenured" employee-associates after completing six years of service, a
figure once considered unusually high! 74
We hypothesize that
recessionary conditions since the early 1990s have only exacerbated
these conditions, especially in light of the continued high level of
admissions to the bar! 75
As in the Fordist manufacturing enterprise, flexible or nonstandard work arrangements are also emerging in the new Cravathist
firm, although their meaning and effect must be assessed in context. No
longer does partnership participation lie within the reasonable
expectation of all recruits. New occupational categories of lawyers have
emerged, such as permanent associates, staff lawyers, special counsel,
senior lawyers, and salaried partners. 176 Large law firms have also begun
experiments with flexible work arrangements, such as sabbaticals, job
to eliminate non-producing partners. See Tounament of Lawyers, supranote 132 at 53.
170 The number of associates within the American legal profession increased fivefold between
1951 and 1980. During the same period, the number of partners increased less than threefold. See

Kay & Hagan, supra note 138 at 416.
1 71
ibid. at 417.
172 Hagan, Huxter & Parker, supra note 115 at 14-18, formally define the "professional
proletariat" as associate lawyers who have only clerical persons below them, but some autonomy to

design important aspects of their work or who can only design a few or no important aspects of their
work.
173 Ibid. at 22. As the authors put it, "that suggests the legal profession is surprisingly

proletarianized, albeit with a proletariat that is much better paid and has much better class
prospects than proletariats normally considered."
Note that this research was done in 1985. Continued high levels of admittance of lawyers to
the bar, combined with the recessionary 1990s, would tend to suggest that this size of working-class

lawyers, both absolutely and proportionately, is even larger today than ten years ago. Moreover,
such lawyers face much lower prospects for mobility than did their counterparts in 1985.

1741bid at 27.
175 Whether these material conditions will give rise to demands for reforms to the institutional
structure of the large law firm, which are more transformative than that contemplated in the Task
Force Report,supra note 163, remains to be seen.

176 For more elaboration on these new positions, see Kay & Hagan, supra note 138 at 418.
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sharing, part-time positions, 177 and contracting out files to temporary
legal service providers. 178 Temporary lawyers work on a hourly basis
(for "sweat hours," not billable hours), receive no benefits, and can be
hired or dismissed with as little as two days' notice. 179 And, of course,
paraprofessionals are being used in ever-greater numbers to perform
work once done by lawyers. In short, "flexible" work arrangements are
emerging in the Cravathist firm, as in many sectors of the North
American economy, because of management's desire to cut costs
through personnel policies that increasingly recategorize employees as
variable rather than fixed costs for the firm.
We must neither romanticize the Cravathist firm in its "golden
age," nor forget that it is today-as it always was-primarily a profitmaking venture. As such, it remains almost uniquely successful as a
form of organization within the legal profession. However, functional,
financial, structural, managerial, and cultural changes, driven by intense
competitive pressures, seem to be transforming the Cravathist firm at
the very moment of its greatest success. Contemporaneously, and
arguably as a consequence, Cravathism seems to be experiencing a crisis
of morale and stability, an increase in individual self-seeking, intra-firm
disputes, defections and schisms, bankruptcies and dissolutions, ethical
lapses, and even defalcations. This crisis raises long-term questions not
only about the prosperity of individual firms, but about the very survival
of Cravathism in the new economy.
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See "The New Lawyer Temp" (April 1994) 3 National 16.

178 One of the largest such agencies in Canada is Advocate Placement Ltd., which has 400
lawyers registered with it. Eighty-three per cent of its lawyers who were placed in temporary jobs in
1993 had been recently called to the Bar (.e, between 1983 and 1988).
179 SeeM. Conrod, "Pleasures and pitfalls of flexible work arrangements for lawyers" 12 The
Lawyers Weekly (2 April 1993) 1 and 23.

